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HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM IN AN AGE OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERCONNECTEDNESS 
WAYNE A. LOGAN†
INTRODUCTION 
A central precept in American governance is that states should be 
afforded latitude to pursue their own course in social and economic 
matters.  With such autonomy, as famously recognized by Justice 
Brandeis, the states can serve as “laborator[ies],” enjoying the free-
dom to undertake “experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try.”1  States, ideally, can thereby also better legislate in a fashion con-
 
 † Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.  Special thanks to Markus 
Dubber, Stuart Green, Sandra Guerra-Thompson, David Logan, Michael O’Hear, Mark 
Rosen, Kevin Washburn, and Ron Wright for comments and suggestions; Meg Daniel 
for editorial support; and Brad Endicott and Carl Nowlin for research assistance. 
1 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
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sistent with the views of their citizens,2 permitting a healthy democ-
ratic pluralism to flourish, which in turn allows individuals to “vote 
with their feet”3 and increases governmental responsiveness by “put-
ting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”4
Since the Framing Era, diversity has marked state civil5 and crimi-
nal6 law alike, at once shaping and reflecting local norms and prac-
tices.  Consistent with the tenets of “fifty-labs” federalism,7 and the 
Supreme Court’s abiding reluctance to regulate state criminal law8 
2 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“[Federalism] assures a decen-
tralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous 
society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes . . . .”); 
Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy:  May Congress Commandeer State Offi-
cers To Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1074 (1995) (asserting that fed-
eralism permits “greater local tailoring and aggregate diversity of policies throughout 
the nation”). 
3 The concept derives from the seminal work of Charles Tiebout, who, analogizing 
from behaviors in consumerist private markets, reasoned that individuals in a federalist 
system will gravitate to jurisdictions that best serve their personal needs and convic-
tions.  See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
418-19 (1956) (“[T]he consumer-voter moves to that community whose local govern-
ment best satisfies his set of preferences.  The greater the number of communities and 
the greater the variance among them, the closer [he] will come to fully realizing his 
preference position.”).  For more on Tiebout’s work as it applies to criminal law varia-
tions among the states, see infra note 360 and accompanying text. 
4 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:  Evaluating the 
Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1504 (1987) (“The liberty that is protected by 
federalism is not the liberty of the apodictic solution, but the liberty that comes from 
diversity coupled with mobility.”). 
5 See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 513-18 (2002) (discussing variations in state tort law). 
6 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952) (“[C]rimes in the United 
States are what the laws of the individual States make them . . . .”). 
7 See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (“The Constitution leaves in the 
possession of each State ‘certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign 
power.’  Foremost among the prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and 
enforce a criminal code.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 55 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961))).  Of late, this deference has been most manifest in deci-
sions by the Court to invalidate federal laws seen as unduly intruding upon state crimi-
nal law prerogatives.  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) 
(invalidating a federal law prohibiting firearm possession on school premises or within 
a 1000-foot radius of a school because the law lacked a sufficient nexus with federal 
concerns under the Commerce Clause); cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
627 (2000) (invalidating a federal law allowing civil damages for victims of gender-
motivated violence). 
8 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Crimi-
nal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 54 (1997) (“Constitutionally speaking, substantive criminal 
law is almost entirely unregulated.”).  Two noteworthy exceptions to this historic solici-
tude can be found in the Court’s recent controversial decisions in Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating a Texas law criminalizing consensual homosex-
  
2005] HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM 259 
 
and its attendant sanctions,9 states continue to evince diverse views on 
criminal law matters in particular.  One sees disagreement on such ba-
sic matters as whether particular behavior should be criminalized;10 
the definitions of criminal offenses;11 the availability of defenses;12 
punishments13 and the means by which they are determined;14 resort 
to imprisonment (versus community-based sanctions);15 and even the 
rationales justifying punishment.16
Diversity also exists in the rights and procedures marking state 
criminal justice systems.  While the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause 
ual sodomy), and Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2212 (2005) (invalidating a Cali-
fornia law decriminalizing the medical use of marijuana). 
9 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (stating that the Supreme Court 
does not sit as a “superlegislature” to “second-guess” punishment decisions of state leg-
islatures); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (noting that parameters of re-
cidivist enhancement laws “are matters largely within the discretion of the punishing 
jurisdiction”). 
10 See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 
821 (2004) (noting varied state views on criminalizing possession of small amounts of 
marijuana); Amy C. Radosevich, Note, Thwarting the Stalker:  Are Anti-Stalking Measures 
Keeping Pace with Today’s Stalker?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1371, 1381-85 (2000) (noting that 
some states have enacted anti-stalking laws and that there is significant variation 
among existing statutes).  For a discussion of other historic examples of state diversity, 
concerning such matters as prostitution and polygamy, see Wayne A. Logan, Criminal 
Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 367-68 (2003). 
11 See, e.g., Iris Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Con-
sequences of “Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696, 1720-29 (1999) (dis-
cussing substantive variations in state definitions of statutory rape, assault and battery, 
petty theft, and driving under the influence).  This diversity, in turn, is augmented by 
political subunits of state governments—municipalities—which enjoy authority to 
regulate criminal behaviors.  See Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal 
Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1421-38 (2001) (discussing the authority of munici-
palities to enact penal laws as a result of their home rule powers). 
12 See, e.g., 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §§ 171-194 (1984 & 
Supp. 2005) (surveying state variations in excuse-related defenses). 
13 As the Supreme Court has noted, “the classification of state crimes differs widely 
among the States.”  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 n.14 (1984).  Compare, e.g., 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 152.01(16), .027(4) (West 2005) (punishing possession of more 
than 42.5 grams of marijuana as a petty misdemeanor), with N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-
03.1-23(6) (Supp. 2005) (punishing such possession as a felony).  For a comprehensive 
overview of differences in state drug laws, see GALE GROUP, NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
STATE LAWS 163-200 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 4th ed. 2003). 
14 See, e.g., Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Practices, 
in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 222, 226-27 (Michael Tonry & 
Richard S. Frase eds., 2001) (noting variations in state sentencing guideline systems). 
15 See Kevin R. Reitz, The Federal Role in Sentencing Law and Policy, 543 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 125 (1996) (demonstrating that state-level incarceration 
rates vary by a factor of seven). 
16 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 1127, 1132 n.20 (1997) (discussing differing state penal rationales). 
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requires that states, at a minimum, provide their citizens with rights 
prescribed by federal law,17 the states of course are free to extend 
more protections18 and otherwise operate their criminal justice sys-
tems largely free of federal dictate.19
This Article examines some of the challenges bred by this diver-
sity, which, rather than deriving from the frequently clashing competi-
tive interests of states,20 result from the states’ increasing interconnec-
tion in criminal justice matters.  Two foremost examples of this 
phenomenon are examined here:  criminal recidivist sentence en-
hancement laws and sex offender registration laws.  Both types of laws 
have been in effect in some form for decades and have evolved over 
time to accommodate ex-offenders, who, consistent with constitu-
tional freedom of movement, change state residences.  With these re-
finements, the states have sought to prohibit such individuals from es-
caping continued accountability for their past wrongdoing21 and 
deprive them of an incentive to migrate elsewhere in search of a 
“clean slate.”22  As President Clinton warned when signing federal leg-
17 See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial 
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 149 (2001) (observing that state experimentation with consti-
tutional rights “is limited by a ‘floor’ of basic federal constitutional guarantees”). 
18 See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (stating that fed-
eral law does not “limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sov-
ereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than 
those conferred by the Federal Constitution”). 
19 See, e.g., MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 189-206 (2d ed. 
2003) (surveying the broad latitude of states in the operation of their juvenile justice 
systems).  This is so despite the increasing imposition of federal constitutional stric-
tures, first as a result of pro-defendant Warren Court holdings, and later as a result of 
pro-prosecution holdings of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.  For more on the states’ 
“lively” role and “fervent self-determination” in criminal justice policy, see Ronald F. 
Wright, How the Supreme Court Delivers Fire and Ice to State Criminal Justice, 59 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1429, 1430, 1457 (2002). 
20 As Paul Freund noted over fifty years ago, “[a] federal system presupposes diver-
sity and must cope with corresponding tensions.”  Paul A. Freund, Umpiring the Federal 
System, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 561 (1954). 
21 See People v. Johnson, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463, 470 (Ct. App. 1995) (endorsing  the 
goal of “attacking the recidivism of violent sex offenders by providing for longer en-
hancements for prior convictions . . . irrespective of where, or in which jurisdiction, 
the prior crimes were perpetrated”). 
22 See State v. Hulbert, 544 S.E.2d 919, 923-24 (W. Va. 2001) (asserting that failure 
to consider foreign convictions in recidivist determinations would “invite” ex-offenders 
to enter the state in search of a “‘clean slate,’ thereby enabling them to continue 
committing [crimes] in [the] state . . . without realizing the legislatively-intended ef-
fects of enhanced punishment for repeat offenders”); see also, e.g., Alison Bath, Sex 
Criminals Flocking to Nevada, RENO GAZETTE-J., Sept. 26, 2004, at 8H, available at 
http://www.infoweb.newsbank.com (follow “America’s Newspapers” hyperlink to 
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islation authorizing a national sex offender registry for the use of law 
enforcement:  “If you dare to prey on our children, the law will follow 
you wherever you go—state to state, town to town.”23
The Article begins with an overview of the means by which recidi-
vist enhancement and registration laws take account of out-of-state 
prior convictions, critically important matters largely ignored by 
commentators.24  While state courts often face challenges in applying 
recidivist and registration laws to indigenous offenders, their task is 
made considerably more difficult when the predicate convictions oc-
curred elsewhere.  In such situations, courts must interpret and apply 
the law of another state to determine if the conviction, itself possibly 
aged or marked by ambiguous or incomplete information, warrants 
consideration under their recidivist or registration law.  Part I of this 
Article examines the two basic approaches—external and internal—
that jurisdictions use to make such determinations.  The internal ap-
proach requires that out-of-state convictions, and any punishment re-
sulting from those convictions, satisfy the eligibility requirements of 
the forum state’s registration or recidivist enhancement law.  The ex-
ternal approach, on the other hand, allows such decisions to be based 
on the legal determinations of the forum state’s fellow sovereigns. 
“Reno Gazette-Journal” hyperlink) (noting local concern over the perceived “mass exo-
dus by sex offenders” to Nevada because of lax registration laws and enforcement). 
23 Ron Fournier, Clinton Signs Law on Sex Offenders, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 18, 1996, 
at 12; see also Brian McGrory, Clinton Sets Tracking of Sex Offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 
25, 1996, at A1 (quoting President Clinton’s intent in signing the law:  “to keep track 
of [sex offenders] . . . not just in a single state, but wherever they go . . . so that parents 
and police have the warning they need to protect our children . . . . Deadly criminals 
don’t stay within state lines, so neither should law enforcement’s tools to stop them”).  
Currently, the U.S. Department of Justice coordinates “a nationwide, Internet-based, 
searchable National Sex Offender Public Registry website,” which promises “one-stop 
access to registries from all 50 states and the District of Columbia by the end of the 
year.”  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National Sex Offender Public Registry, 
http://www.nsopr.gov (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). 
24 With respect to recidivist enhancements, the literature contains only a single 
entry, a brief descriptive account by a student commentator published over a decade 
ago.  See Richard A. Galt, Comment, The Use of Out-of-State Convictions for Enhancing Sen-
tences of Repeat Offenders, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1133 (1994).  State interconnection relative to 
registration has been wholly ignored, with commentators focusing instead on the many 
constitutional and policy implications of registration itself.  See, e.g., James R. Acker & 
Catherine Cerulli, When Answers Precede Questions:  Megan’s Law’s Uncertain Policy Conse-
quences, 34 CRIM. L. BULL. 235, 240-58 (1998) (discussing the public policy conse-
quences of the enforcement of registration laws); Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the 
Preventive State:  Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1177-82 (1999) (examining the procedural due process 
issues potentially presented by registration and notification). 
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Part II explores the ramifications of interconnection and states’ 
use (or non-use) of one another’s criminal justice outcomes.  These 
ramifications assume practical and theoretical form, and vary in ac-
cordance with states’ adoption of the internal or external approach.  
In terms of the practical ramifications, the internal approach poses 
particular analytic challenges because states often must undertake a 
difficult interstate exercise in statutory construction.  Because the ap-
proach places premium importance on the forum’s legal norms, with-
out deference to how the prior conviction was treated in the other 
state, it is not uncommon for individuals to escape continued ac-
countability.  This very uncertainty, however, can raise notice con-
cerns for immigrants who must fathom (with respect to registration 
laws, often in a very short time period) the legal consequences of their 
prior conviction in their newly adopted state.  Such concerns are not 
as pronounced in states using an external approach because, as noted, 
such legal consequences are predetermined by the individual’s erst-
while state of residence. 
The external approach, however, results in a consequence of a dif-
ferent sort:  unequal treatment of otherwise similarly situated indi-
viduals.  Because registration and recidivist enhancement outcomes 
are allowed to hinge on how another state would resolve the question, 
individuals hailing from especially punitive states can suffer differen-
tially compared both to their counterparts who enter the forum with 
convictions from less punitive states and to those indigenous to the fo-
rum.  For individuals, the geographic happenstance of their criminal 
history in effect determines their destiny.  For society as a whole, 
states’ at times extreme criminal law positions are permitted to ripple 
across not just space but also time, because recidivist and registration 
laws consider convictions from years before, allowing perhaps draco-
nian and retrograde mores to be frozen in amber and given ongoing, 
contemporary effect. 
Even more intriguing are the theoretical implications of state in-
terconnection, examined in Part III.  Internal approach states can be 
seen as stalwarts of “fifty-labs” federalism.  They make their own calls 
on recidivist and registration eligibility, and resist the characteriza-
tions afforded convictions by other states, thereby giving effect to state 
autonomy and diversity.  External approach states, on the other hand, 
place premium importance on uniformity and comity.  Their deferen-
tial approach, in addition to depriving the nation of a “lab,” has a 
number of subtle yet significant collateral consequences.  These in-
clude the following:  the deflection of political responsibility for the 
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adoption of criminal law norms, which themselves might otherwise 
not garner sufficient political support in the forum; the skewing of the 
ostensibly local character of the criminal law; and the removal of in-
centives for “laggard” states to conform their laws to the standards of 
their more progressive peers, possibly contributing to a “race to the 
bottom.”  Finally, with more uniformity and less experimentation 
come diminished prospects for democratic competition, with atten-
dant negative effects on the constitutional right of free travel. 
Whatever its benefits, criminal justice interconnection has major 
practical and theoretical implications for “our federalism,”25 which 
have gone unaddressed.  While courts and commentators have fo-
cused intensely upon federal-state interrelations in criminal justice 
matters,26 and “vertical” federalism more generally,27 scant attention 
has been paid to the interactions among the states, or “horizontal” 
federalism,28 notwithstanding the reality that states process the lion’s 
share of U.S. criminal offenders.29  As the ensuing discussion makes 
clear, as the states determine the fate of immigrant offenders, they are 
laying bare many of the benefits and pitfalls of diversity (and uniform-
25See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(lauding “the theory and utility of our federalism”); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 
37, 44-45 (1971) (propounding the benefits of a federalist system). 
26 For a sample of the voluminous (and ever-expanding) commentary on federali-
zation, most of it highly critical, see, for example, Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mis-
chief:  The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995); Steven 
D. Clymer, Unequal Justice:  The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643 
(1997). 
27 Federalism, of course, has always admitted of different meanings.  This Article 
borrows from a definition provided by Roderick Hills:  federalism is taken to mean 
“the delegation of governmental powers to territorially limited governments within a 
nation [where] the policymakers of the limited governments are elected by the per-
sons residing within those governments’ jurisdictions.”  Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Po-
litical Economy of Cooperative Federalism:  Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sover-
eignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 815 n.3 (1998). 
28 On the horizontal and vertical characterizations of federalism more generally, 
see Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1100 (1996) (noting 
that in our federalist system, “power is divided ‘vertically’ between the states and the 
federal government and ‘horizontally’ among the several states”).  Horizontal federal-
ism, of course, is susceptible of federal-centric application and definition as well.  See L. 
Harold Levinson, The Legitimate Expectation that Public Officials Will Act Consistently, 46 
AM. J. COMP. L. 549, 551-52 (1998) (explaining that horizontal federalism can also re-
fer to the relationship between and among the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of the federal government). 
29 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.2(b) (1999 & Supp. 
2005) (characterizing the federal criminal justice system as a “bit player” compared to 
the states and citing data in support (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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ity) in a federal republic whose constituent criminal justice systems are 
increasingly marked by interconnectedness. 
I.  THE MECHANICS OF INTERCONNECTION 
U.S. jurisdictions have only comparatively recently evinced a sensi-
tivity to criminal law outcomes in sister states.  Indeed, historically, 
states readily indulged their power to physically banish offenders in 
the interest of territorial purification, regardless of the negative effects 
on their fellow sovereigns.30  By the 1930s, however, states came to 
recognize the folly of shuttling their unwanted among themselves and 
began to make common enterprise in handling criminal offenders.31  
During this time crime also ascended to prominence as a problem of 
national proportion,32 prompted in large part by anxiety over the in-
creasing mobility of criminal offenders.33  In 1934, states entered into 
the first interstate compacts allowing for the monitoring of itinerant 
30 See James Grahame, Progress of the Colonies:  The Persecution of the Quakers, in 1 THE 
GREAT REPUBLIC BY THE MASTER HISTORIANS 217, 219-21 (Charles Morris ed., 1912) 
(describing the use of banishment in the colonial era); Matthew D. Borrelli, Note, Ban-
ishment:  The Constitutional and Public Policy Arguments Against This Revived Ancient Pun-
ishment, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 469, 469-86 (2003) (surveying more modern use of ban-
ishment). 
 For a discussion of modern-day expulsionist impulses, predicated on the natural 
competitive zeal of states to “out-tough” one another in their crime control efforts, see 
Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice:  Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdic-
tional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1849-57 (2005).  For a rebuttal, based in part 
on the evidence advanced here, see Wayne A. Logan, Crime, Criminals and Competitive 
Crime Control, 104 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
31 See, e.g., People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 96 (Mich. 1930) (concluding that ban-
ishment “tend[s] to incite dissension, provoke retaliation, and disturb that fundamen-
tal equality of political rights among the several states which is the basis of the Union 
itself”). 
32 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 273 
(1993) (identifying Herbert Hoover’s 1929 inaugural address as the genesis of crime 
being viewed as a “national issue”). 
33 See id. at 266 (“Crime had become interstate. . . . Twentieth century criminals 
had wheels and wings.”); Francis H. Bohlen & Harry Shulman, Arrest With and Without a 
Warrant, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 491-92 (1927) (“People no longer live their whole lives 
in the village in which they were born.”).  During this era, Congress also awakened to 
the problems presented by the increasing mobility of criminal offenders, prompting a 
surge in federal criminal laws covering behavior previously the exclusive focus of states.  
See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 102 (1943) (noting that “[b]y 1934 great 
concern had been expressed over interstate operations by gangsters against banks—
activities with which local authorities were frequently unable to cope,” and noting new 
federal legislation to address the concern). 
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ex-offenders and the continued accountability of absconders.34  In 
1935, the Interstate Commission on Crime was established in the 
name of enhancing intergovernmental cooperation in crime control.  
The “interstate criminal was the first target for attack,” and the Com-
mission worked to address “loopholes . . . in criminal law administra-
tion which aided the ‘commuting criminal’ . . . while at the same time 
handicapping police and law enforcement officials.”35
Today, faced with an increasingly mobile citizenry,36 states have 
even more reason to be mindful of how their fellow sovereigns handle 
criminal offenders, despite the challenges often presented37 and the 
competitive impulses frequently marking interstate relations.38  This 
Part examines two specific instances of such interconnection:  the use 
34 See Deborah A. Hansen, State Efforts Toward National Crime Control, 63 J. ST. 
GOV’T 72, 72-73 (1990) (discussing the development of the Compact for the Supervi-
sion of Parolees and Probationers).  Until Congress enacted the Crime Control Con-
sent Act of 1934, states were forbidden from entering into formal crime control 
agreements of a coordinated nature.  Id. at 73 (citing Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 
503, 517-20 (1893), which prohibited interstate compacts that would affect the political 
balance of the federal system).  For a discussion of the emergence of compacts during 
this period more generally, see Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact 
Clause of the Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 695-98 
(1925). 
 For the modern incarnation of the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of 
Adult Offenders, see 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2000) (“The consent of Congress is hereby 
given to any two or more States to enter into agreements or compacts for cooperative 
effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of 
their respective criminal laws and policies . . . .”).  As of 2003, forty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia had adopted the Compact.  Michael L. Buenger & Richard L. 
Masters, The Interstate Compact on Adult Offender Supervision:  Using Old Tools to Solve New 
Problems, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 71, 73 (2003). 
35 INTERSTATE COMM’N ON CRIME, A REPORT OF ACTIVITIES FOR THE YEAR ENDING 
DECEMBER 31, 1937, at 3 (1937).  The loopholes fell into “three natural categories—
apprehension, prosecution, trial, and punishment.”  Id.  To this end, in 1935 the 
Commission drafted uniform reciprocal acts for state adoption, allowing for expanded 
interstate cooperation in the areas of fresh pursuit, extradition, witness rendition, and 
parole and probation supervision.  Id. at 4-6. 
36 According to the 2000 Census, an estimated 8.4 million Americans changed 
state residences during the preceding twelve-month period.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
ANNUAL GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY RATES, BY TYPE OF MOVEMENT:  1947-2003, at 1  
tbl.A-1 (2004), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/tab-a-1.pdf.  
On the issue of criminal mobility more generally, see Joseph Deutsch et al., Interjuris-
dictional Criminal Mobility:  A Theoretical Perspective, 21 URB. STUD. 451 (1984). 
37 See People v. Parker, 359 N.E.2d 348, 350 (N.Y. 1976) (“[C]rimes committed in 
other jurisdictions . . . with differing social mores and standards of conduct take on 
added significance in our highly mobile society.”). 
38 On the development of cooperative norms in otherwise competitive or combat-
ive environs more generally, see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 
3 (1984); PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS 6 (1986). 
  
266 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 257 
 
of prior out-of-state convictions to (1) enhance the prison terms of of-
fenders convicted of a new crime in the forum state and (2) require 
that newly arrived individuals comply with the forum’s sex offender 
registration requirements. 
A.  Criminal Recidivist Laws 
1.  Historical Background 
Although recidivism has been called “a traditional, if not the most 
traditional, basis for a sentencing court’s increasing an offender’s sen-
tence,”39 and prior offenses have been used to enhance sentences in 
the United States since the seventeenth century,40 recidivist laws tradi-
tionally paid little heed to foreign prior offenses.41  Indeed, there was 
scant need to do so given that criminal activity itself was largely a local 
phenomenon.42  In addition to this lack of practical need, states re-
mained wary of the wide procedural variations distinguishing the 
criminal justice systems of individual states.  Writing in 1934, for in-
stance, the Georgia Supreme Court invoked such differences in sup-
port of its decision to exclude foreign convictions from consideration 
when the Georgia recidivist statute made no reference to them: 
The courts of Georgia do not take judicial cognizance of the laws of 
these foreign jurisdictions, and therefore we cannot attribute to our 
General Assembly an intention to give equal dignity to proof of a convic-
tion in another jurisdiction to that which properly inheres in those of 
our own state, when it may be that in many of these states important 
39 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998); see also Graham v. 
West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912) (“The propriety of inflicting severer punish-
ment upon [recidivist] offenders has long been recognized in this country . . . .”). 
40 For more on the history of criminal recidivist laws, see Wayne A. Logan, Civil 
and Criminal Recidivists:  Extraterritoriality in Tort and Crime, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1609, 
1618-20 (2005) (tracing the history of U.S. recidivist laws back to the colonial era).  In 
practical terms, the laws assumed importance only in the late 1700s because until that 
time death was typically imposed on even first-time felons.  Id. at 1618. 
41 The term “foreign” is used throughout this Article to refer to domestic jurisdic-
tions other than the forum state (i.e., other U.S. states and the District of Columbia), 
not to other nations.  For a discussion of the use of foreign nation convictions in mak-
ing recidivist determinations, see Martha Kimes, Note, The Effect of Foreign Criminal Con-
victions Under American Repeat Offender Statutes:  A Case Against the Use of Foreign Crimes in 
Determining Habitual Criminal Status, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 503, 506-18 (1997); 
Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International Enforcement of Crimi-
nal Law, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 37, 37 (1990) (noting that the challenge of confronting 
“transnational crime” has “internationalized” criminal law). 
42 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 22 (explaining that early American criminal jus-
tice was shaped by the fact that colonial life was “small-scale”). 
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rules of procedure, in criminal trials, are entirely different from those 
which our Legislature has adopted for our government.
43
In ensuing years, states became sensitized to the desirability of 
considering out-of-state convictions, despite the continued variability 
of state laws.  By 1939, the recidivist laws of a majority of U.S. jurisdic-
tions embraced the “external” method, which classified foreign con-
victions in the same way the foreign jurisdiction did at the time of 
conviction, regardless of how the offense would be regarded by the fo-
rum state.44  Under this method, the focus was on whether the foreign 
conviction resulted in sufficient punishment to warrant application of 
the forum’s recidivist offender law (typically a one-year prison term, 
equating with felony status), not whether the underlying behavior was 
criminalized in the forum, or if a crime would warrant felony status 
(and thus enhancement viability) in the forum.45  Likewise, foreign 
convictions were recognized even if they were obtained without pro-
cedural or constitutional protections that would be available in the fo-
rum state.46  As the Idaho Supreme Court put it in 1942, the external 
approach embodies the sentiment that “[g]ood citizenship requires 
obedience and observance to the laws of sister states as much as those 
of this state.”47
In 1961, the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code endorsed 
the external approach.48  According to the Code’s commentary, def-
erence to foreign state determinations “was regarded by the Institute 
as the most appropriate guide to the seriousness of the prior crime, a 
guide that also avoids the problems of grading crimes by forum law 
when the crimes are defined in a manner not replicated in the fo-
rum.”49
On the other extreme there existed the “strict internal” view.  
With this approach the forum ignored foreign convictions, giving 
43 Lowe v. State, 177 S.E. 240, 240 (Ga. 1934). 
44 See Lyndon B. Allen, Comment, Provisions for Foreign Convictions in Habitual 
Criminal Legislation, 2 LA. L. REV. 177, 177 (1939) (defining the external view as accord-
ing “foreign convictions . . . exactly the same effect as local convictions”). 
45 Id. 
46 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 76 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (Gen. Term 1947) (recognizing 
two prior felony convictions in New Jersey even though the convictions were obtained 
after waiver of indictment, impermissible under New York law). 
47 State v. Prince, 132 P.2d 146, 149 (Idaho 1942). 
48 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.05(1) (1962) (“[A foreign] conviction shall be 
deemed to have been of a felony if [a] sentence of death or of imprisonment in excess 
of one year was authorized under the law of [the] other jurisdiction . . . .”). 
49 Id. § 7.05 cmt. 1. 
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them no effect whatsoever.50  By the mid-1970s only one state (Vir-
ginia) used such an approach.51
The remaining states compromised, adopting a modified internal 
approach, reflecting neither the extreme deference to the judgments 
of other states characteristic of the external view, nor the insular dis-
regard for them marking the strict internal view.  Under this ap-
proach, the forum court examined its indigenous law to determine 
whether the foreign conviction would qualify as a crime warranting 
recidivist enhancement under its own state law.52  Praising the ap-
proach in 1974, and presaging its state’s adoption of the internal ap-
proach one year later, one New York court identified what it saw as the 
ill-effects of the external approach.  Under it, an individual “convicted 
of Fornication in Alabama, Seduction in Texas, Blasphemy in New Jer-
sey . . . or of stealing a library book in North Carolina or a turkey in 
Arkansas,” would be sentenced as a recidivist offender in New York, 
even though New York would not see fit to criminalize such behaviors, 
or would punish them by less than a year in prison, making them in-
eligible for enhancement.53
50 Until recently, Florida’s recidivist laws, in part, reflected such a strict internal 
view.  For many years, the State’s “habitual felon” law expressly excluded consideration 
of prior non-Florida felony convictions, while its “habitual violent felon” law did not.  
In 1989, the Florida Legislature amended the habitual felon law to allow consideration 
of foreign convictions.  See Clark v. State, 823 So. 2d 809, 811-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002) (discussing the amendment expanding consideration of foreign convictions). 
51 See Susan Buckley, Comment, Don’t Steal a Turkey in Arkansas—The Second Felony 
Offender in New York, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 76, 79 (1976) (citing and discussing VA. 
CODE ANN. § 53-296 (1974), which “gives no effect to foreign convictions”); see also 
Note, Recidivism and Virginia’s “Come-Back” Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 597, 597-601 (1962) 
(noting Virginia’s refusal to consider foreign convictions and condemning the ap-
proach for its underinclusiveness). 
52 See Fletcher v. State, 409 A.2d 1254, 1255 (Del. 1979) (endorsing the limited 
internal approach, which eschews reliance “on technical classifications of other juris-
dictions over which [the forum] legislature has no control”). 
53 People v. Mazzie, 358 N.Y.S.2d 307, 311-12 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (citations omitted); 
see also Mitchell v. State, 467 A.2d 522, 533 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (“Cutting cacti in 
California, uprooting the state flower . . . in West Virginia, or desecrating a confeder-
ate cemetery in Mississippi may be felonies punishable by imprisonment in those 
states.  We . . . would not consider such acts as proper bases for mandatory sentenc-
ing—no matter how they are viewed by the several jurisdictions.”). 
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2.  Modern Approaches 
Today, a majority of jurisdictions (twenty-eight) employ a modi-
fied internal approach.54  As in the past, under this approach the sen-
tencing court of the forum state examines the elements of the foreign 
conviction to determine if it would have qualified as a predicate for 
enhancement under the governing law of the forum.55  The states vary 
in the rigor of the statutory exegesis they require.  New York, for in-
54 ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(1)(B) (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604(N) 
(2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(f) (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40 
(West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084(1)(c)(1)(r), .084(1)(e) (West 2005); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 17-10-7(a), (b)(2) (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/33B-1(a) (West 
2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A)(1) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 
1252(4-A), (4-C) (1983 & Supp. 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 769.10(1), 
769.11(1) (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.1095(1)(d) (West 2003); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW §§ 70.04(1)(b)(i), 70.06(1)(b)(i) (McKinney 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.14(e) (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.11, 2929.13(F)(6) (LexisNexis 
2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 54 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.725(2)(b), (c) 
(2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9721, 303.8(f)(1), (2) (West 2004); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 17-25-45(A)(2), (B)(3) (1976 & Supp. 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-7 
(2004 & Supp. 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-106(b)(5), -107(b)(5), -108(b)(5) 
(1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5(c)(ii) (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 11, 
11a(a) (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1(B) (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
9.92.090, 9.94A.030(29)(u), .030(33)(a)(ii), .030(40)(b), 9.94A.525(3) (West 2005). 
 In five states, the internal approach is used as a result of judicial interpretation.  
See Burgin v. State, 824 So. 2d 77, 81 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (interpreting ALA. CODE § 
13A-5-9(a)); Fletcher v. State, 409 A.2d 1254, 1255 (Del. 1979) (interpreting DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214); State v. Edmondson, 818 P.2d 855, 856-61 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1991) (interpreting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17(A)); Hubbard v. State, 544 A.2d 346, 
352 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (interpreting the predecessor to MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW §14-101); Justice v. Hedrick, 350 S.E.2d 565, 566-69 (W. Va. 1986) (interpreting 
W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18). 
55 Typically, with both the internal and external approaches, the prosecution has 
the burden of convincing the court of the existence of an enhancement-eligible predi-
cate by a preponderance of the evidence.  See, e.g., State v. Cabrera, 868 P.2d 179, 181 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (“In establishing the defendant’s criminal history for sentencing 
purposes, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a prior convic-
tion exists.”).  But see State v. Mankiller, 722 P.2d 1183, 1192 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding that an out-of-state “judgment and sentence was prima facie proof of defen-
dant’s prior conviction” and that “[t]he burden was then on defendant to show that 
the prior conviction did not qualify under the New Mexico habitual offender statute”).  
A few states require that eligibility be proven to the court beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8(g) (West 2004) (requiring proof beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant accumulated two prior unrelated felony convictions).  
In addition, a handful of jurisdictions require that the jury, not the court, determine 
whether a prior conviction qualifies for enhancement.  See infra note 187 (citing exam-
ples of jurisdictions requiring that the “fact” of prior conviction be proven before a 
jury). 
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stance, uses a strict “essential elements” test,56 whereas other states re-
quire that foreign predicates have elements “similar”57 or “substan-
tially equivalent”58 to those warranting recidivist enhancement in the 
forum.  With the internal approach courts must undertake a detailed 
comparative analysis of the respective criminal codes to ascertain 
whether the foreign conviction would warrant felony treatment in the 
forum.59
The process can be difficult enough given the complex nature of 
modern criminal codes, with outcomes (even among physically con-
tiguous states)60 turning on such questions as whether the states simi-
56 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.04(1)(b)(i) (McKinney 1998) (“The conviction must 
have been . . . in any other jurisdiction of an offense which includes all of the essential 
elements of any such felony for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess 
of one year . . . is authorized in this state.”). 
57 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(1)(B) (2004) (“[A] conviction in this or 
another jurisdiction of an offense having elements similar to those of a felony defined 
as such under Alaska law . . . is considered a prior felony conviction . . . .”).  In 1996, 
Alaska changed its criterion from “substantially identical” to “similar,” a more inclusive 
standard.  See Harlow v. State, 820 P.2d 307, 309 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (“The main 
difference between the two statutes, for purposes of this appeal, is that requiring a 
prior offense to have elements ‘substantially identical’ appears to be more strict than 
requiring the prior offense to have elements ‘similar.’”). 
58 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.13(F)(6) (LexisNexis 2004) (incorporat-
ing any “offense under an existing or former law of this state, another state, or the 
United States that is or was substantially equivalent to one of those offenses”); see also 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40 (West 2001) (requiring throughout that prior convic-
tions in foreign states have “essential elements” that are “substantially the same”); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 775.084(1)(a)(1), .084(1)(e) (West 2005) (requiring that prior convic-
tions in other states be “substantially similar in elements and penalties”); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252(4-A) (1983 & Supp. 2004) (requiring convictions in other 
states to be for “essentially similar crimes”). 
59 See, e.g., Ex parte French, 687 So. 2d 205, 206 (Ala. 1996) (rejecting the use of a 
Georgia felony conviction for sentence enhancement because the underlying conduct, 
possessing a firearm during a drug transaction, did not constitute a felony in Ala-
bama); State v. Clough, 829 P.2d 1263, 1265-67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting the use 
of a prior Montana felony conviction for issuing a bad check because analogous crime 
in Arizona contained an intent element lacking in Montana law); State v. Glenn, 493 
So. 2d 806, 813-14 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting the use of a Texas felony conviction 
for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle because the equivalent behavior constituted a 
misdemeanor in Louisiana); People v. Gonzalez, 463 N.E.2d 1210, 1211 (N.Y. 1984) 
(rejecting the use of two Florida convictions for aggravated assault because it was un-
clear whether or not the underlying conduct constituted a felony in New York). 
60 See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 888 (Fla. 1997) (rejecting the use of a 
Georgia conviction for “robbery by sudden snatching” because its elements were not 
“substantially similar” to those of the comparable Florida offense); Lewis v. State, 587 
S.E.2d 245, 246-47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting the use of a Tennessee conviction for 
aggravated assault because the defendant’s “conduct may not constitute a felony in 
Georgia”). 
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larly define burglary,61 assault,62 or driving under the influence and 
causing bodily harm;63 employ similar monetary loss thresholds for 
larceny convictions;64 or use similar levels of impairment for purposes 
of defining driving under the influence.65  Often the interpretative 
task is made more difficult by the lack of a precisely analogous crimi-
nal provision in the foreign state.  In Tennessee, for instance, statu-
tory law provides that when a foreign felony “is not a named felony in 
this state, the elements of the offense shall be used by the Tennessee 
court to determine what classification the offense is given.”66  More-
over, the task is complicated by the requirement that courts must 
identify and construe the foreign criminal law in effect when the 
predicate conviction was rendered, which frequently entails historical 
review dating back many years.67
While some jurisdictions prohibit consultation of the record sup-
porting the foreign conviction, focusing only on the elements of the 
offense committed,68 many do allow the evidentiary record to be con-
sulted, permitting consideration of accusatory instruments, plea tran-
61 See, e.g., Timothy v. State, 90 P.3d 177, 180 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (holding that 
Alaska’s definition of “burglary” differed sufficiently from Illinois’ that defendant’s Il-
linois burglary conviction could not justify an enhanced sentence). 
62 See, e.g., State v. Tapp, 821 P.2d 1098, 1099-1100 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (determin-
ing that the elements of assault in Washington State would not constitute a felony in 
Oregon). 
63 See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S. Ct. 377, 381-82 & nn.5-6 (2004) (noting the varied 
mens rea requirements among state drunk driving laws). 
64 See, e.g., State v. Acosta, No. 29512-1-II, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 2187, at *29 (Ct. 
App. Sept. 21, 2004) (distinguishing the value element of Washington’s second degree 
theft laws from California’s petty theft law, which lacks a value determination). 
65 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shaw, 744 A.2d 739, 744-45 (Pa. 2000) (holding that 
New York’s provision “requires an appreciably lesser degree of impairment than does 
Pennsylvania’s”); cf. Shinault v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 652, 654 (Va. 1984) (hold-
ing that Virginia and North Carolina laws are not “substantially similar” due to the dif-
fering effects of presumptions in their respective laws). 
66 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-106(b)(5) (1997); see also People v. Quintanilla, 571 
N.W.2d 228, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the conduct proscribed by for-
eign law, not its classification as a felony in the foreign state, controls analysis of 
whether felony recidivist status is warranted in Michigan). 
67 Mississippi, for instance, imposes no time limit on the remoteness of prior con-
victions.  See Adams v. State, 410 So. 2d 1332, 1334 (Miss. 1982) (“Remoteness in the 
convictions relied upon for enhanced punishment is not a factor to be considered.”). 
68 See, e.g., Montoure v. State, 880 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (hold-
ing that Florida courts can only consider the elements of a foreign conviction, and not 
the trial record, when determining whether an out-of-state crime has a Florida equiva-
lent); State v. Golden, 829 P.2d 88, 90 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that Oregon courts 
can consider only the elements of the foreign conviction, not its underlying facts, in 
determining the criminal history of the individual to be sentenced). 
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scripts, and the like.69  This evaluative task itself can be quite difficult 
because the records supporting pleas or convictions (themselves often 
aged) are frequently ambiguous or incomplete.70  As New York’s high-
est court put it, “[d]etermining whether a particular out-of-State con-
viction is the equivalent of a New York felony may involve production 
and examination of foreign accusatory instruments and, conceivably, 
the resolution of evidentiary disputes, all in the context of compari-
sons with the law of other jurisdictions.”71  Adding to the uncertainty, 
judicial analysis can be influenced by the public policy informing the 
forum’s recidivist law and perhaps the predicate crime itself.72
Most jurisdictions using the internal approach do not attach dis-
positive significance to the punishment imposed by the foreign state; 
rather, their analysis turns on whether the foreign crime of conviction 
would be punishable as a felony in the forum.73  In State v. Bush, for 
69 California permits this as a matter of course.  See People v. Riel, 998 P.2d 969, 
1005 (Cal. 2000) (holding that the government can “go behind the statutory elements 
of the crime to prove that a defendant’s actual crime constitutes a felony under Cali-
fornia law”).  Other jurisdictions do so only under limited circumstances.  See, e.g., 
State v. Miller, No. 29326-9-II, 2004 WL 1240374, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. May 25, 2004) 
(“If the elements are not identical or if the Washington statute defines the offense 
more narrowly than does the foreign statute, the trial court may review the record of 
the out-of-state conviction to determine whether the defendant’s conduct would have 
violated the comparable Washington offense.”). 
70 See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 587 S.E.2d 245, 246-47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting the 
use of a Tennessee conviction for sentence enhancement because the record did not 
make clear whether the conduct underlying the offense to which the defendant pled 
guilty would constitute a felony in Georgia). 
71 People v. Samms, 731 N.E.2d 1118, 1122 (N.Y. 2000).  Some fifty years before, 
the same court warned of the perils of relying on accusatory instruments: 
The application of [recidivist enhancement] cannot be made to turn upon 
the expansiveness of the prosecutor who prepared and drafted the indictment 
in the other State.  One prosecutor may content himself with pleading only 
essential allegations, while another may choose to include immaterial and sur-
plus recitals.  Liberty—even of habitual malefactors—is too important to de-
pend upon the drafting technique or the pleading preference of a particular 
official. 
People v. Olah, 89 N.E.2d 329, 332 (N.Y. 1949). 
72 See, e.g., State v. Zulfer, 547 S.E.2d 885, 887-88 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (“To shift 
the focus to the fact that a defendant’s prior offenses may have occurred in different 
jurisdictions would thwart the objective of requiring heightened accountability from 
repeat offenders for their subsequent crimes.”).  But see Commonwealth v. Shaw, 744 
A.2d 739, 745 (Pa. 2000) (Cappy, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for continu-
ing “to promote the fiction that equivalency can also be determined by the mere fact 
that the underlying public policy of both statutes is similar”). 
73 As noted by the Louisiana Court of Appeal, “[t]he habitual offender statute re-
quires Louisiana courts to determine the analogous Louisiana crime according to the 
nature of the act involved in the crime of the other state or jurisdiction, not the pen-
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instance, the Washington Supreme Court deemed a Kansas misde-
meanor battery conviction a felony for enhancement purposes be-
cause the conduct at issue was categorized as a felony under Washing-
ton law.74  According to the Bush court, this was “to ensure that 
defendants with equivalent prior convictions are treated the same way 
regardless of whether those prior convictions were incurred in Wash-
ington or elsewhere.”75  Disregarding the foreign punishment out-
come avoided allowing a repeat offender to evade “imposition of a 
greater sentence merely because the other state imposes a shorter 
prison term.”76  Washington courts, in short, enjoy full authority to 
“reclassify the conviction of a sister state to determine punishment for 
a current in-state conviction.  This reclassification process has no im-
pact on the full faith and credit clause because a sister state has no au-
thority to regulate Washington’s sentencing process.”77
In some internal approach states, however, the focus is on the 
length of punishment imposed by the foreign sovereign, but again 
without regard for how the offense is classified (felony or misde-
meanor) there.  In Ware v. Commonwealth, for instance, the defendant 
pled guilty to a felony (stalking) in Kentucky, and the prosecution 
successfully petitioned to have him qualify as a persistent felony of-
fender based on two prior North Carolina convictions for driving with 
a revoked license and causing damage to personal property.78  While 
North Carolina designated both prior convictions as misdemeanors, 
each carried a maximum penalty of up to two years imprisonment, 
and Ware received sentences of eighteen months (probated for three 
alty provided for the offense in the other state or jurisdiction.”  State v. Hennis, 734 So. 
2d 21, 24 (La. Ct. App. 1999); see also, e.g., Dunham v. State, 762 P.2d 969, 975 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1988) (ordering a reduction in the defendant’s sentence because “the 
length of the sentence imposed under Missouri law is not a proper basis for determin-
ing whether a crime is a misdemeanor or a felony under Oklahoma law”); Justice v. 
Hedrick, 350 S.E.2d 565, 568 (W. Va. 1986) (“[W]hether the conviction of a crime out-
side of West Virginia may be the basis for application of the West Virginia Habitual 
Criminal Statute depends upon the classification of that crime in this State.” (citation 
omitted)). 
74 9 P.3d 219, 223-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
75 Id. at 225. 
76 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Franklin, 729 P.2d 70, 
73 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)); see also id. (“The elements of the crime, not its maximum 
punishment, determine whether a crime is comparable.”). 
77 Id.  For a similar expression of this sentiment see, for example, Mancini v. State, 
904 P.2d 430, 432-33 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (“The effect of a prior criminal convic-
tion . . . on the sentencing of an Alaska offender implicates issues of policy that are 
uniquely Alaskan in character and have nothing to do with California law.”). 
78 47 S.W.3d 333, 333-34 (Ky. 2001). 
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years) for the driving conviction and two years (probated for three 
years) for the damage to property conviction.79  Because Kentucky law 
deemed a felony any conviction for which a sentence of more than 
one year was imposed, regardless of its classification in the foreign 
state, the North Carolina misdemeanor convictions were properly 
counted in Kentucky,80 even though North Carolina would not have 
treated Ware as a felon recidivist.81
This punishment-specific focus can lead to some uncertain out-
comes.  While it is often the case, as in Ware, that the analysis does not 
redound to a defendant’s benefit, the opposite can be true.  Such an 
outcome occurs when a foreign state classifies the conduct underlying 
the conviction as a felony yet the forum state does not, requiring that 
the prior conviction be disregarded for enhancement purposes.82
The skepticism characteristic of the internal approach also ex-
tends to various types of dispositions.  For instance, foreign convic-
tions resulting in dismissal because the defendant satisfied terms of 
probation or deferred adjudication can be counted by the forum, 
even when the foreign jurisdiction would ignore such convictions for 
enhancement purposes.83  Similarly, foreign pleas of nolo contendere 
79 Id. at 334. 
80 Id.  In support, the Ware court cited to the law’s 1974 commentary suggesting 
that the standard 
seeks to account for the possibility of conviction from a state which has a dis-
tinction between felony and misdemeanor that is different from that used in 
this state.  Thus, although such conviction is for an offense designated in that 
other state as a misdemeanor, it can be treated as a felony for purposes of this 
statute if it carried a penalty of one year or more. 
Id. (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 cmt. (1974)). 
81 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.14(b)(1)--(5)(2003) (noting that in North 
Carolina, non-traffic misdemeanor convictions add one point to an offender’s prior 
record score, while felonies add between two and ten points). 
82 See, e.g., Elston v. State, 687 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (“When 
the state seeks to use a defendant’s out-of-state felony convictions to enhance his sen-
tence under [Alabama law], the state must prove that the conduct for which the de-
fendant was previously convicted constituted a felony in Alabama when it was commit-
ted.”). 
83 See, e.g., People v. Laino, 87 P.3d 27, 37-39 (Cal. 2004) (ruling that a defendant’s 
earlier conviction for aggravated assault in Arizona, for which he was placed in a diver-
sion program, was a conviction under California’s three strikes law); State v. Courtney, 
682 N.W.2d 185, 201 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that crimes for which the defen-
dant had received a suspended imposition of sentence in another state could be used 
to enhance a subsequent Minnesota sentence), rev’d on other grounds, 696 N.W.2d 73 
(Minn. 2005); State v. Edmondson, 818 P.2d 855, 857 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (sustaining 
the enhanced sentence of a defendant who had received deferred adjudication in 
Texas because even though his conviction could not be considered in Texas, “[i]t does 
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can be counted when the foreign states themselves would not count 
nolo pleas when assessing recidivism,84 or, if counted by the foreign 
state, can be disregarded when the forum state deems them unworthy 
of recidivism consideration.85  Finally, internal states typically disre-
gard foreign decisions to expunge convictions,86 and disregard foreign 
decisions to restore the civil rights of convicted felons (e.g., the right 
to carry a firearm).87  In short, as the California Supreme Court re-
cently noted, jurisdictions adopting the internal approach take the 
view that “‘the profile of the shadow that conviction casts on later 
events is the business of the state where those later events occur.’”88
Internal approach states show considerable variation in their treat-
ment of foreign decisions relative to the treatment of juvenile offend-
ers.  Very often prior juvenile misconduct is not counted when the fo-
rum would ignore it for recidivist purposes, even if it would justify 
enhancement in the foreign jurisdiction.  In State v. Thomas,89 for in-
stance, the Minnesota Court of Appeals refused to count a foreign ju-
venile conviction, citing its concern that “defendants with similar 
criminal histories should not receive disparate treatment depending 
on the age of majority of the state in which they committed prior of-
not follow, however, that a New Mexico court cannot use the conviction for purposes 
of our habitual-offender statute”).  
84 See, e.g., McClish v. State, 962 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Ark. 1998) (upholding the trial 
court’s decision to consider evidence of the defendant’s foreign nolo pleas and de-
ferred sentence when determining whether the defendant was a habitual offender). 
85 See, e.g., McCray v. State, 738 So. 2d 911, 916 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (holding 
that a defendant’s prior Florida convictions based on nolo pleas could not be used in 
Alabama to enhance his punishment). 
86 See State v. Clifton, 481 S.E.2d 393, 399-400 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (surveying 
state treatments of expunctions).  Executive pardons, on the other hand, do often re-
ceive deference, with states taking one of two approaches:  regarding pardons as “re-
moving an adjudication of guilt” or regarding pardons as having the “effect of remov-
ing punishment and penalties and restoring civil rights, but [failing to] remove the 
adjudication of guilt.”  R.J.L. v. State, 887 So. 2d 1268, 1278-79 (Fla. 2004).  States have 
also enacted provisions specifying that pardons based on innocence be accorded spe-
cial deference.  See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06(1)(b)(vi) (McKinney 1998) (barring 
consideration of felony convictions when defendant has been pardoned on innocence 
grounds). 
87 See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Commonwealth, 599 S.E.2d 482, 487 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) 
(ignoring West Virginia’s decision to restore a defendant’s right to carry a firearm and 
permitting a defendant to be prosecuted for illegal firearm possession in Virginia), 
aff’d, 599 S.E.2d 482 (Va. 2005). 
88 Laino, 87 P.3d at 37 (quoting Poo v. Head, 1992 WL 30617, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
12, 1992)); see also id. at 40 (“No matter what leniency Arizona may or may not bestow 
upon its recidivist criminals . . . once we are satisfied that such conviction constitutes a 
strike under our three strikes law, that prior crime will count here.”). 
89 374 N.W.2d 586 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
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fenses.”90  Not all states evince such a critical view, however.  For in-
stance, in Louisiana, a youth accorded adult status by a foreign court 
and convicted of a felony there will be deemed a recidivist even 
though Louisiana would have processed the youth as a juvenile and 
later would have withheld recidivist enhancement.91
Alternatively, twenty-two jurisdictions (including the District of 
Columbia) today use an external approach when assessing foreign 
convictions.92  As with the earlier incarnation of the approach, disposi-
90 Id. at 588; see also, e.g., Justice v. Hedrick, 350 S.E.2d 565, 568 (W. Va. 1986) (re-
jecting consideration of a prior Michigan conviction because the defendant would 
have been treated as a juvenile in West Virginia). 
91 See State v. Youngblood, 647 So. 2d 1388, 1391-92 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (uphold-
ing sentencing enhancement based on a foreign conviction while the defendant was a 
juvenile).  According to the court, by treating the juvenile as an adult, the “youthful 
offender is made aware of the seriousness of his behavior and thereby placed on notice 
that, in the event of further violations, society will not regard his actions as minor 
childhood transgressions to be forgiven upon reaching maturity.”  Id. at 1391; see also 
McManners v. State, 650 P.2d 414, 416 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (counting a foreign ju-
venile conviction and noting that “‘recent criminal conduct, regardless of whether it 
antedates the somewhat fortuitous date of legal majority, can aid in the effort to ascer-
tain the magnitude of a defendant’s threat to society’” (quoting Davenport v. State, 
543 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Alaska 1975)). 
92 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-503 (1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-801(2) (2004); 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1804a(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
706-665 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2514 (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-1(a)(b) 
(West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.8 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4504, 21-
4711(e) (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (LexisNexis 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
279, § 25 (LexisNexis 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-81, 99-19-83 (West 1999); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-501 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (1995); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 207.010(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(II) (Lex-
isNexis Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-4(c) (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-
21 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.62(2), (3)(b) (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-
201 (2005).  North Dakota also employs the external approach, but counts foreign 
convictions only when they are punishable by a maximum term of five years or more.  
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09(1)(c) (1997 & Supp. 2005). 
 Missouri and Texas have adopted the external approach as a result of judicial de-
cision.  See State v. Taylor, 779 S.W.2d 636, 642 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (“The State was 
not required to prove that the conduct underlying defendant’s Kansas felony convic-
tion would have been punishable as a felony under Missouri law.”); Dotson v. State, 28 
S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (deferring to Louisiana’s classification of the of-
fense as a felony and using a prior Louisiana conviction for enhancement). 
 State laws, it is important to note, can vary in their fealty to methods of recidivist 
assessment, depending on the circumstances.  For instance, North Carolina, which 
uses an internal approach for purposes of assessing criminal history, see supra note 54, 
uses an external approach when evaluating foreign misconduct for purposes of evalu-
ating “habitual felons.”  See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-7.1 (2003) (defining a predicate 
offense as “an offense which is a felony under the laws of the State or other sovereign 
wherein a plea of guilty was entered or a conviction was returned regardless of the sen-
tence actually imposed”).  On the other hand, New Jersey’s “three strikes” law, unlike 
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tive importance attaches to how the foreign jurisdiction treated the 
earlier conviction.  If the previous misconduct resulted in a felony 
conviction in another jurisdiction, the forum state will consider it for 
enhancement, even if the offense would not have been a felony in the 
forum state and thus would not trigger enhancement if committed 
there.93  As noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals, foreign predicates 
“must be for felonies under the laws of the state where the conviction 
was entered. . . . [I]t [is] immaterial . . . whether the convictions in 
other states were for crimes that would also have been felonies under 
Idaho law, so long as they were for felonies where the offenses oc-
curred.”94  In New Jersey, however, foreign misdemeanors for which 
punishment in excess of six months is “authorized” (not necessarily 
its general recidivist enhancement law that uses the external approach, requires that a 
foreign conviction be based on a “similar” statute to that warranting a strike in New 
Jersey or a crime that is “substantially equivalent” to an enumerated crime.  See N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.1 (West 2005).  Likewise, Wisconsin’s “three strikes” law is trig-
gered by foreign predicates that are “comparable” to offenses qualifying under its law.  
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.62(2m)(d) (defining “[s]erious felony” as a crime under the 
“law of any other state . . . that is comparable” to an enumerated Wisconsin predicate).  
Texas, for its part, employs the internal approach for its life-eligible enhancements.  See 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(2)(B)(v), .42(g)(2) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2005) 
(counting foreign convictions for offenses having “elements that are substantially simi-
lar”). 
 Recidivist laws can also single out specific predicate crimes for internal approach 
treatment.  Colorado’s external approach law, for instance, manifests its concern for 
differing state views on drug offenses in particular, creating an exception for foreign 
drug-related convictions.  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-801(1)(f)(3) (West 2004) 
(“No drug law conviction shall be counted as a prior felony conviction . . . unless such 
prior offense would be a felony if committed in this state at the time of the commission 
of the new offense.”); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-7.1 (2003) (specifically prohibiting 
consideration of prior federal felony convictions for alcohol-related offenses). 
93 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 74 P.3d 349, 356 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (allowing 
enhancement for a prior California felony of “petty theft with a prior conviction”); 
State v. Crispin, 671 P.2d 502, 509 (Kan. 1983) (allowing enhancement for a prior Cali-
fornia felony DUI); State v. Rellihan, 662 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (allow-
ing enhancement for a prior Oklahoma felony of “burglary of a vending machine”); 
Dotson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 53, 56-57 (Tex. App. 2000) (allowing enhancement for a 
prior Louisiana felony conviction for “illegal possession of stolen things,” which re-
quired a lower dollar amount than required by Texas law); Cain v. State, 721 S.W.2d 
493, 494-95 (Tex. App. 1986) (allowing enhancement for a prior Louisiana felony con-
viction for negligent homicide). 
94 State v. Williams, 651 P.2d 569, 580 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982); see also, e.g., Gunder-
son v. State, 925 P.2d 1300, 1305 (Wyo. 1996) (“The fact that the previous convictions 
were felonies in the rendering states but may not have been felonies in Wyoming is 
immaterial.  The convictions were still felony convictions.”). 
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imposed) are eligible for enhancement.95  As a result, an offender who 
receives a fine as a sentence, and hence was afforded neither a right to 
counsel96 nor indictment,97 can be subject to enhancement.98
External approach states also show greater tolerance for different 
procedures used in their fellow states.  This deference often translates 
into a disregard of the procedural norms that would otherwise pre-
clude consideration of such convictions if they had occurred in-state.  
For instance, if a foreign state counts a juvenile conviction it will be 
counted in the forum state, irrespective of the latter’s refusal to con-
sider juvenile misconduct for its indigenous offenders.99  Likewise, 
nolo contendere pleas, if counted by the foreign state, are counted in 
the forum state even when not recognized under its enhancement 
law.100  In addition, foreign predicates rising to felony status only be-
cause they themselves were enhanced can be counted for purposes of 
sentence enhancement.101
95 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:44-3, :44-4 (West 2005) (including a conviction in an-
other jurisdiction with over six months of imprisonment as a “prior conviction” for 
which enhancement is authorized). 
96 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (holding that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to appointed counsel is triggered only when the defendant is subject to “ac-
tual imprisonment”).  While for a time uncounseled convictions could not be used to 
enhance sentences for subsequent convictions, see Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227 
(1980) (holding that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used to 
support an enhancement for a second misdemeanor theft conviction), the Supreme 
Court eventually lifted this prohibition, see Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 
(1994) (allowing a sentencing court to consider a prior uncounseled misdemeanor for 
a sentence enhancement when the misdemeanor did not result in imprisonment). 
97 See 2 SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.2 (2d ed. 2004) 
(surveying different state provisions on when the right to indictment attaches). 
98 Such outcomes provide a prime example of a subtle yet important effect:  sub-
stantive laws undercutting procedural protections.  For more on this phenomenon, see 
Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive Punishment, 
59 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1411, 1413 (2002) (discussing the power of the legislative and 
executive branches to use substantive law to neutralize criminal procedure protec-
tions). 
99 See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 781 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding the 
defendant a persistent offender because his prior conduct was a felony in Arkansas, 
even though he would have been adjudicated as a juvenile in Missouri). 
100 See, e.g., State v. Vizcaino-Roque, 800 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (allow-
ing sentence enhancement based on a nolo contendere plea in Florida). 
101 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 74 P.3d 349, 356 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (allowing 
enhancement in Colorado based on a prior California felony of “petty theft with a 
prior conviction”). 
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B.  Sex Offender Registration 
1.  Background 
Requiring criminal offenders to register with government authori-
ties first took root in the United States in the 1930s.  The initial regis-
tration provisions were enacted by municipalities and typically tar-
geted felons as a class.102  While nominally intended to help police 
monitor and track ex-offenders in the jurisdiction, the ordinances in 
fact were often used to discourage ex-offenders from locating to cities 
in the first instance, and failing this, as a ready basis for incarceration 
and expulsion (via bartered suspended sentences) should the ex-
offender violate the registration requirement.103  To maximize cover-
age, the municipal ordinances took account of foreign convictions, 
using internal and external approaches.104  The Norfolk, Virginia, or-
dinance for instance broadly provided that “‘[a]ny person who . . . has 
been . . . convicted of any offense punishable as a felony in the state or 
elsewhere’” must register, seemingly requiring a familiarity with the laws 
of jurisdictions worldwide.105  By 1957, the era of municipal registra-
tion laws came to an end as the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a Los 
Angeles ordinance on due process grounds out of concern that rea-
sonable persons were not likely to recognize the need to inquire into 
the existence of the local law.106
In the 1990s, registration was resuscitated, this time by state gov-
ernments that singled out sex offenders in particular.  Triggered by 
high-profile victimizations of eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling in Min-
nesota and seven-year-old Megan Kanka in New Jersey, states nation-
wide enacted registration laws, augmented eventually with require-
ments that community members be notified of registrants’ presence 
102 See Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances:  Police Control Over Potential Recidivists, 
103 U. PA. L. REV. 60, 61-63 (1954) (discussing the history and background of registra-
tion provisions).  As of 1954, only five states (Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, and 
New Jersey) had criminal registration statutes.  Id. at 65 n.28. 
103 Id. at 63, 104. 
104 Id. at 68-69. 
105 Id. at 69 n.50 (quoting the registration ordinance of Norfolk, Virginia). 
106 See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1957) (holding that due proc-
ess requires “actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of 
such knowledge”).  The Court was also troubled by the passive nature of the prohibi-
tion (i.e., punishing an omission, not an act) and that the offense itself was malum 
prohibitum.  Id.  For further discussion of Lambert and its influence on modern regis-
tration laws enacted by states, see infra notes 217--24 and accompanying text. 
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(community notification).107  Today, all U.S. jurisdictions have regis-
tration laws in effect, prompted by the federal government’s threats in 
the Jacob Wetterling Act (1994)108 and Megan’s Law (1996)109 to with-
hold funds from non-compliant states.110  The laws specify that states 
must register persons convicted of criminal offenses against victims 
who are minors,111 as well as those convicted of a “sexually violent of-
fense,”112 and maintain registration of such individuals for a minimum 
107 See Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification:  Emerg-
ing Legal and Research Issues, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 337, 337-38 (2003) (recount-
ing events leading to the modern proliferation of registration and notification laws). 
108 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Reg-
istration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000)). 
109 Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14071(d) (1996)). 
110 See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2)(A), (B) (2000) (specifying that non-compliant 
states shall not receive ten percent of federal funds otherwise allotted and that such 
money is to be reallocated among compliant states).  For criticism of Congress’ budg-
etary strong-arm techniques in this area and others, see Richard W. Garnett, The New 
Federalism, The Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23 
(2003).  The irony of conservative federal legislators holding states fiscally hostage to 
federal policy desires, while at the same time touting states’ rights, was not lost on at 
least one elected representative.  See 142 CONG. REC. H4456 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) 
(statement of Rep. Melvin Watt) (criticizing “Big Brother Government” and urging 
that states be able “to make their own decisions about whether they want a Megan’s law 
or do not want a Megan’s law”). 
111 The category is defined as the following: 
[A]ny criminal offense in a range of offenses specified by State law which is 
comparable to or which exceeds the following range of offenses: 
(i)    kidnapping of a minor, except by a parent; 
(ii)   false imprisonment of a minor, except by a parent; 
(iii)  criminal sexual conduct toward a minor; 
(iv)   solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct; 
(v)    use of a minor in a sexual performance; 
(vi)   solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution; 
(vii)  any conduct that by its nature is a sexual offense against a minor; or 
(viii) an attempt to commit an offense described in any of the clauses (i) 
through (vii), if the State— 
 (I)   makes such an attempt a criminal offense; and 
 (II)  chooses to include such an offense in those which are criminal offenses 
    against a victim who is a minor for the purposes of this section. 
42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(A). 
112 See id. § 14071(a)(3)(B) (including “a range of [state law] offenses . . . which is 
comparable to or which exceeds the range of offenses encompassed by aggravated 
sexual abuse or sexual abuse . . . [or] that has as its elements engaging in physical con-
tact with another person with intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual 
abuse”). 
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of ten years.113  The Pam Lyncher Act (1996),114 named after an adult 
sexual assault victim, requires lifetime registration for offenders with 
two or more prior convictions for registration-eligible offenses and 
those initially convicted of specified “aggravated” sex offenses.115  Fi-
nally, in 1998, Congress required that states take steps to identify 
“sexually violent predators,” by means of judicial hearings.116  Such of-
fenders, who are subject to lifetime registration and must verify their 
address information with the state on a quarterly basis,117 are those 
who have “been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suf-
fer[] from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes 
[them] likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.”118
Current state laws at a minimum contain the aforementioned reg-
istration eligibility criteria.  However, as the implementing guidelines 
make clear, these standards “constitute a floor for state programs, not 
a ceiling.”119  States are free to broaden the list of offenses warranting 
registration, lengthen the mandated minimum periods of registration, 
and impose more stringent registration regulations than federal law.120  
As a result, significant variation exists in the types of offenses warrant-
ing registration under state laws. 
For instance, Alabama targets public display of obscene bumper 
stickers, signs, or writings;121 Kansas, adultery if one party is less than 
113 Id. § 14071(b)(6)(A); see also Megan’s Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wet-
terling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 64 
Fed. Reg. 572, 579 (Jan. 5, 1999) (describing the minimum registration procedures 
required of states). 
114 Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-236, 110 Stat. 3093 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14072 (2000)). 
115 42 U.S.C. § 14072(d)(2). 
116 Id. § 14071(a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(1)(B), (b)(6)(B); see also Final Guidelines, 64 
Fed. Reg. at 583 (describing special registration process for “sexually violent preda-
tors”). 
117 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(3)(B). 
118 Id. § 14071(a)(3)(C).  For a definition of “sexually violent offense,” see supra 
note 112.  Federal law defines “mental abnormality” as “a congenital or acquired con-
dition of the person that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a 
manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a 
degree that makes the person a menace to the health and safety of other persons.”  42 
U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(D) (2000).  Congress failed to define “personality disorder,” 
making it a matter of state discretion.  See Final Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. at 583 (“The 
definition of ‘personality disorder’ is a matter of state discretion since the Act includes 
no specification on this point.”). 
119 Final Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. at 575. 
120 Id. 
121 ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (Supp. 2005). 
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eighteen years of age;122 Oregon, promoting (and compelling) prosti-
tution,123 South Dakota, bestiality and indecent exposure;124 South 
Carolina, peeping, voyeurism, buggery, indecent exposure, or a “simi-
lar offense”;125 Idaho and Louisiana, a “crime against nature”;126 North 
Dakota, peeping and indecent exposure;127 and Connecticut, consen-
sual sex between minors.128  Moreover, several states target the posses-
sion of child pornography (as opposed to its production or distribu-
tion);129 require registration for non-sexual offense convictions that do 
not involve child victims—e.g., involuntary manslaughter (Kansas),130 
kidnapping (Minnesota),131 or homicide and aggravated assault (Mon-
tana);132 and do not limit registerable offenses to felonies.133  Finally, 
at least twenty-eight states subject juveniles to registration.134
While the statutory law of all states contains a laundry list of speci-
fied crimes warranting registration, several states supplement their list 
with open-ended language that substantially broadens the scope of 
registration.  For instance, in Minnesota a court can require registra-
tion for any conviction “arising out of the same set of circumstances” 
122 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(a)(5)(A) (Supp. 2004). 
123 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 181.594(2)(j)--(k) (Supp. 2005). 
124 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-30(11), (14) (2004). 
125 S.C. CODE ANN.  § 23-3-430(C)(10), (12), (14), (17), (18) (Supp. 2004). 
126 IDAHO CODE ANN.  § 18-8304(a) (2004 & Supp. 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 
15:541(14.1) (2005). 
127 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(1)(e) (Supp. 2005). 
128 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-250(5), -251(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005). 
129 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.61.127, 12.63.010, 12.63.100(6)(C)(v) (2004) (in-
corporating possession of child pornography in the definition of sex offenses requiring 
registration); MO. ANN. STAT. § 589.400(1)(2) (West Supp. 2005) (mandating registra-
tion for conviction of possessing child pornography); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
62.001(5)(B) (Vernon, Westlaw through 2005 2d Called Session of the 79th Legisla-
ture) (same).  For its part, federal law requires registration for convictions relating 
only to the “production and distribution of child pornography.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 
14071(a)(3)(A)(viii) (West 2005). 
130 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(d)(5) (Supp. 2004). 
131 2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 136 (West) (amending MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
243.166(1)(a)(1)(ii) (West 2003 & West Supp. 2005)). 
132 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-502(9)(a) (2003). 
133 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.100(6)(C)(ii), (vi) (2004) (requiring registration 
for conviction of a Class A misdemeanor); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(2)(b) (Supp. 
2005) (requiring registration for those found guilty of misdemeanor sexual offenses); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130(9)(a)(v) (West Supp. 2005) (including certain 
gross misdemeanors in the definition of “sex offense”). 
134 Elizabeth Garfinkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America:  The Misapplication of 
Sex-Offender Registration and Community-Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91 CAL. L. REV. 163, 
177-78 (2003). 
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as a charged felony offense that statutory law specifies as requiring 
registration.135  As a result, so long as a statutorily enumerated offense 
is charged by Minnesota prosecutors, and a conviction for some of-
fense (even a misdemeanor) results, registration is required if the 
“arising out of” requirement is satisfied.136  Other states require regis-
tration when one is convicted of a non-enumerated offense and the 
underlying behavior is “sexually motivated” or committed with a “sex-
ual purpose” or for “sexual gratification.”137 For its part, Alabama tar-
gets “generally any act of sexual perversion involving a member of the 
same or the opposite sex, or any sexual abuse of any member of the 
same or the opposite sex . . . .”138  South Carolina permits registration 
for non-statutorily specified offenses if “good cause is shown by the 
[prosecutor].”139  Iowa requires registration of those who have “com-
mitted” offenses that would be “indictable” under its law.140 
135 2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 136 (West) (amending MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
243.166(1)(a)(1) (West 2003 & West Supp. 2005)). 
136 Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 715-16 (Minn. 1999).  As a result, as the 
Eighth Circuit recently acknowledged: 
[T]he statute may lead to unfair results in some cases.  We note, for example, 
the statute would require registration of a person accused of both a predatory 
offense and a non-predatory offense arising out of the same set of circum-
stances who exercised his right to a trial and was acquitted of the predatory of-
fense but convicted of the non-predatory one. 
Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 645 (8th Cir. 2003).  For more pointed criticism of 
the law, in particular the “enormity of the potential unchecked power” it reposes in 
prosecutors, see State v. Newell, No. C1-02-310, 2002 WL 31253657, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Oct. 8, 2002). 
137 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(2)(E) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005) (requiring 
registration if the court finds “that the person committed the offense as a result of sex-
ual compulsion”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-254(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005) (in-
cluding “any felony that the court finds was committed for a sexual purpose”); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(c)(14) (Supp. 2004) (including “sexually motivated offenses”); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179D.410(18) (LexisNexis Supp. 2001) (including “sexually 
motivated” offenses); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.130(9)(a), 9.94A.030(39) (West 2000 
& Supp. 2005) (requiring registration if the crime was committed “for the purpose of 
his or her sexual gratification”); see also, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-
701(d)(7) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2003) (requiring registration for “a crime that by 
its nature is a sexual offense against a person under the age of 18 years”); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 12.1-32-15(2)(e) (Supp. 2005) (requiring registration when the “individual 
demonstrated mental abnormality or sexual predatory conduct in the commission of 
the offense”). 
138 ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994). 
139 S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430(D) (Supp. 2004). 
140 IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.1(5)(o), (9)(e) (West Supp. 2005). 
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2.  Approaches to Registration 
 The variation just described, both in terms of offenses warranting 
registration and broad language permitting courts to require registra-
tion on an ad hoc basis, creates challenges for sister jurisdictions in-
tent on ensuring that itinerant offenders not evade accountability for 
their past misconduct.  States have adopted different approaches to 
resolving whether individuals with foreign convictions must register 
upon arrival in their newly adopted state.  As with recidivist laws, one 
sees two basic camps:  internal and external.141
Thirty-five jurisdictions use an internal approach requiring that 
newly arrived ex-offenders register in the forum only if the foreign 
predicate comes within the ambit of registerable offenses specified by 
the forum.142  Registration laws, like their recidivist counterparts, dif-
141 With both approaches, whether a foreign conviction warrants registration is a 
question of law for the court to decide.  See, e.g., State v. Kunz, 100 P.3d 26, 28 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2004) (“Whether the trial court properly applied [the state registration stat-
ute] is a question of law . . . .”); State v. Chun, 76 P.3d 935, 942 n.12 (Haw. 2003) 
(“[W]hether a person must register as a ‘sex offender’ . . . is a question of law.”). 
 The process for individuals categorized by other states as “sexually violent preda-
tors,” a subgroup thought uniquely dangerous and subject to the most draconian regis-
tration (and notification) requirements, is more procedurally involved.  See supra notes 
116-18 and accompanying text (discussing the federal minimum requirements for such 
determinations).  In Ohio, for instance, the court must first assess whether the foreign 
conviction is “substantially similar” to an Ohio offense requiring predator designation.  
If so, the individual is entitled to a hearing in which he has the burden of showing by 
clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to commit another sexually oriented 
offense in the future.  The court’s ultimate decision must be supported by findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.  State v. Pasqua, 811 N.E.2d 601, 606 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2004). 
142 ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200(b) (1994 & Supp. 2004); ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.100(6) 
(2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821 (2001 & Supp. 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 54-253(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120(e)(1) (2001); 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4001(6),(8)(G) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 42-1-12(a)(7) (1997 & Supp. 2005); 2005-1 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 251 
(LexisNexis) (amending HAW. REV. STAT. 846E-1 (1997 & Supp. 2004)); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-8304(1)(b) (2004 & Supp. 2005); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/2(A)(1), 
(2)(C) (West Supp. 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-4(14) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.1(5)(o) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
17.500(6)(c) (LexisNexis 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:541(14.1) (2005); MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-701(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2003); MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 6, § 178C (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2005); 2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 136 (West) 
(amending MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166(1)(a)(4), (d)(1) (West 2003 & West Supp. 
2005); 2005 Neb. Laws 713 (amending NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4003(1)(b) (1996 & Supp. 
2004)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-B:1(III)(b) (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2004); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(b)(3) (West 1995 & Supp. 2005); 2005 N.M. Laws 279 (amending 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-11A-3(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2001)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
208.6(4)(b), (c) (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(3)(b) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE 
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fer in their eligibility language, variously requiring registration if the 
foreign conviction “would” require registration if it occurred in the 
forum,143 or if the foreign conviction is “reasonably”144 or “substan-
tially”145 the same or “similar”146 to a registerable offense in the forum.  
While many jurisdictions narrowly construe the language of their in-
ternal approach laws,147 not all do so.  As recently noted by the D.C. 
Court of Appeals, statutory language requiring registration for “sub-
stantially similar” offenses was “designed to overcome difficulties 
caused by ‘[t]he variations among different jurisdictions in the termi-
ANN. § 2950.01(D)(f), .04(A)(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2005); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 57, § 583(B) (West Supp. 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-2(e) (2002 & Supp. 
2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-202(2) (1997 & Supp. 2001); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art 62.001(5)(H)-(I), 6(E) (Vernon, Westlaw through 2005 2d Called Session of 
the 79th Legislature); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5(1)(e)(ii) (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13, § 5401(10)(C), (11) (Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-902(B) (Supp. 2005); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130(9)(iv), .140(5)(b)(iii)(E) (West 2000 & Supp. 
2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-2 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
301.45(1d)(am)(1) (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-301(a)(ii), (iv) (2005). 
143 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(A) (2001 & Supp. 2004) (requiring 
registration for commission of an offense in a foreign jurisdiction that “would be a 
[specified] violation or attempted violation” if committed in Arizona). 
144 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-502(6)(b) (2003) (requiring registration 
where foreign conviction is “reasonably equivalent”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-
B:1(III)(b) (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2004) (providing for registration for “reasonably 
equivalent” offenses). 
145 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4001(8)(G) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005) 
(mandating registration where foreign conviction is “substantially similar”); 2005 Neb. 
Laws 713 (amending NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4003(1)(b) (1996 & Supp. 2004)) (requir-
ing registration where offense is “substantially equivalent” to one in Nebraska); TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.001(5)(H) (Vernon, Westlaw through 2005 2d Called 
Session of the 79th Legislature)) (commanding registration where the out-of-state con-
viction was “substantially similar” to the enumerated offense in Texas). 
146 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.100(6) (2004) (requiring registration for convic-
tions under the “similar law of another jurisdiction”); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-902(B) 
(Supp. 2005) (mandating registration where a conviction constitutes a “similar of-
fense” to those enumerated in Virginia). 
147 See, e.g., Cain v. State, 872 A.2d 681, 692 (Md. 2005) (holding that elements of 
the crime of conviction, not underlying facts, must qualify as a sexual offense against a 
minor, as required by registration law).  The rule of lenity, of course, applies only to 
criminal law provisions, which, courts have concluded, sex-offender registration is not.  
However, while registration itself might be nonpunitive for constitutional purposes 
(e.g., double jeopardy), failure to satisfy a registration requirement is a criminal of-
fense, warranting narrow legal construction in the instance of legislative ambiguity.  See 
People v. Franklin, 975 P.2d 30, 33 (Cal. 1999) (applying “favorable construction” to a 
sex offender registration law, given that violation of the law is a penal offense); cf. 
United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying the rule of 
lenity to a federal law that criminalizes possession of firearms by convicted felons). 
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nology and categorizations used in defining sex offenses.’”148  As a re-
sult, the court explained that the statute  
eschews “element-by-element comparisons” between offenses in D.C. and 
similar offenses elsewhere in favor of requiring persons in the District of 
Columbia to register so long as “they have been convicted under the laws 
of other jurisdictions of crimes involving sexual assault or crimes involv-
ing sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of children, or of inchoate offenses 
that aimed at such conduct.” . . . Thus, the Council did not intend the term 
“substantially similar” to be construed narrowly or restrictively.  Rather, 
the Council contemplated that the term would be given a broad con-
struction to effectuate the goals of the legislation.
149
Often the comparison effort is easy enough, readily resulting in a 
conclusion about whether registration is required.  However, because 
state substantive laws vary to such a significant extent, courts com-
monly face a far more difficult analytic task of a comparative law na-
ture—a process again made more difficult by the frequent need to 
construe aged laws and physically and temporally remote conviction 
records.150  In Texas, uniquely, the Department of Public Safety is 
charged with the responsibility of determining whether out-of-state 
convictions warrant registration in Texas, with appeals being made to 
“a district court in Travis County.”151  State law specifies that the De-
partment of Public Safety 
shall provide or make available to each prosecuting attorney’s office in 
the state:  (1) the criteria used in making a determination [of substantial 
similarity]; and (2) any existing record or compilation of offenses under 
the laws of another state . . . that the department has already determined 
148 In re Doe (“S.D.”), 855 A.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C. 2004) (quoting COUNCIL OF D.C. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 13-350, at 21 (1999), which discusses the 
legislative history of D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4001(8)(G)). 
149 Id. at 1104-05 (emphasis added in opinion) (quoting COUNCIL OF D.C. COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 148, at 21 (1999)); see also In re R.B., 870 A.2d 732, 739 
(N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (comparing “essential elements” and “underlying pur-
poses” of offenses, but stating that “[b]ecause the elements of the offense cannot be 
viewed in a vacuum, to make this determination may entail examining the facts under-
lying the offense as charged in the indictment”). 
150 See, e.g., State v. Kuntz, 100 P.3d 26, 30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a 
1981 Minnesota conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the third degree did not re-
quire Arizona registration because, inter alia, it was possible that conviction did not 
involve lack of consent required by the analogous Arizona law); Roe v. Attorney Gen., 
No. 99-2706-H, 1999 WL 1260188, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 1999) (holding that 
a 1983 Florida conviction for indecent assault did not require registration in Massa-
chusetts because Florida law lacked the battery element contained in Massachusetts 
law). 
151 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.003(a), (c) (Vernon, Westlaw through 
2005 2d Called Session of the 79th Legislature). 
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to contain elements that are substantially similar to the elements of of-
fenses under the laws of this state.
152
Sixteen jurisdictions use an external approach.153  In addition to 
specifying offenses warranting registration, external approach states 
require registration if the foreign jurisdiction where the conviction 
occurred required registration, regardless of whether it would warrant 
registration in the forum.154  Moreover, in several states otherwise us-
152 Id. art.  62.003(b). 
153 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-903(12)(A)(iii)(b) (2003 & Supp. 2005); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 290(a)(2)(D)(iii), (iv) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-22-
103(3)(2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0435(1)(a)(3) (West Supp. 2005); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 22-4902(a)(6) (Supp. 2004); 2005 Me. Legis. Serv. 423 (West) (amending ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11202, 11223 (Supp. 2004)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
28.723(3)(1)(d) (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-23(g)(xiv) (West Supp. 2004); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 589.400(1)(5) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
23-502(6)(b) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179D.410(20) (LexisNexis Supp. 2001); 
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-a(2)(d), (3)(b) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2004); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 181.597(2)(c) (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9795.2(b)(4) (West Supp. 
2005); 2005 S.C. Acts 141 (amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430(A) (Supp. 2004)); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-30(18) (2004 & Supp. 2005). 
 Texas law has an external aspect inasmuch as it requires registration of offenders 
who enter Texas subject to foreign state registration, when Texas has entered into a 
“reciprocal registration agreement” with the other state.  See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 62.001(10)(A)(i) (Vernon, Westlaw through 2005 2d Called Session of the 
79th Legislature).  Texas law provides that the Department of Public Safety “may nego-
tiate and enter into a reciprocal registration agreement with any other state to prevent 
residents of this state and residents of the other state from frustrating the public pur-
pose of the registration of sex offenders by moving from one state to the other.”  Id. 
art. 62.052(c).  If such an agreement is in place, immigrants required to register in the 
other state are deemed “extrajurisdictional registrants” in Texas, presuming they are 
not otherwise required to register under Texas law.  See id. art. 62.001(10).  These indi-
viduals, in turn, must remain registered for the time period prescribed by the foreign 
state’s registration regime.  Id.  art. 62.052(b). 
154 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-23(g)(xiv) (West Supp. 2004) (including 
among the offenses for which registration is required “[a]ny offense resulting in a con-
viction in another jurisdiction . . . for which registration is required in the jurisdiction 
where the conviction was had”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179D.410(20) (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2001) (categorizing as a sexual offense “[a]n offense of a sexual nature commit-
ted in another jurisdiction, whether or not the offense would be an offense listed in 
this section, if the person . . . has been required by the laws of that jurisdiction to regis-
ter”); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.597(2)(c) (2003) (requiring registration of “a person re-
quired to register in another state for having committed a sex offense in that state re-
gardless of whether the crime would constitute a sex crime in this state”); 2005 S.C. 
Acts 141 (amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430(A) (Supp. 2004)) (requiring registra-
tion for “an offense for which the person was required to register in the state where 
the conviction or plea occurred”). 
 California’s law, like Colorado’s external-based recidivist law, see supra note 92, 
specifies that particular foreign convictions will not warrant registration in California, 
even if they triggered registration in the foreign state.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 
  
288 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 257 
 
ing an internal approach, the external approach is used with particu-
lar offenders—for instance, temporary visitors as a result of educa-
tional or work arrangements.155
By adopting the external approach, jurisdictions avoid the diffi-
cult case-by-case comparative analysis marking the internal approach.  
New York (which employs an internal approach for recidivism)156 
adopted the external approach to registration in 1999 when it over-
hauled its Megan’s Law.  Evincing the same concern voiced by the 
D.C. Court of Appeals,157 one New York court interpreting the new law 
opined that the amendment was necessary “because ‘[t]he present 
language of the statute [i.e., the “essential elements” test] requires a 
detailed analysis of the statutes in other jurisdictions to determine 
whether registration is required in New York State.’”158  The amend-
ment, in short, was consistent with the Legislature’s intent to expand 
the scope of coverage vis-à-vis out-of-state offenders.159
290(a)(2)(D)(iii), (iv) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005) (excluding foreign convictions that 
are the “equivalent” of indecent exposure, unlawful sexual intercourse, incest, and 
sodomy and oral copulation between consenting adults). 
 For its part, federal law also endorses an external approach.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
14072(g)(3) (2000) (requiring registration of a person “required to register . . . under 
a State sexual offender offender registration program . . . who changes address to a 
State other than the State in which the person resided at the time of the immediately 
preceding registration”).  As a result, all states in theory are obliged to use an external 
approach (presuming they wish to receive federal funds).  However, this aspect of the 
federal Megan’s Law apparently has not been utilized, so in practical terms states re-
main free to adopt whichever approach they wish. 
155 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542.1(H)(6) (2005) (applying the external 
approach to students); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-704(7) (LexisNexis 2001 & 
Supp. 2003) (applying the external approach to workers and students); 2005 R.I. Pub. 
Laws 05-410 (amending R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-3(b) (2002 & Supp. 2004)) (applying 
the external approach to workers and students); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-905(B) (Supp. 
2005) (same). 
156 See supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also People v. Pacheco, 426 
N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (App. Div. 1980) (quoting legislative history to the effect that change 
from an external to an internal approach for recidivism was motivated by the desire for 
“a fairer and more logical approach”). 
157 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. 
158 In re Nadel, 724 N.Y.S.2d 262, 270 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (citation omitted).  In the 
event the prior conviction is not for a felony triggering registration in the foreign ju-
risdiction, the court must undertake the same “essential elements” test used in assess-
ing recidivism.  Id. at 269-70. 
159 Id. at 271; cf. State v. Villanueva, 118 P.3d 179, 182 (Mont. 2005) (“While pre-
sumably similar, the definition of ‘sexual offender’ in all other states will not be identi-
cal to the definition enacted by the Montana Legislature. If only those offenders satis-
fying Montana’s definition were required to register, [recent amendments] . . . would 
be rendered meaningless.”). 
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C.  Summary 
 As discussed, U.S. criminal justice has become more cognizant of 
the benefits of interconnection over the past century.  By reaching out 
to their fellow sovereigns, as they are free to do,160 states are better 
able to fulfill their goals of holding ex-offenders accountable for past 
misconduct and achieving a greater quantum of social control over 
such individuals, whose foreign convictions signify an unwillingness to 
abide by criminal prohibitions. 
The means of achieving this coordination have evolved over time.  
With respect to recidivist enhancements, while initially states paid no 
heed to foreign convictions, eventually they came to see the appeal of 
ascribing “equal dignity” to them.161  By 1939, one commentator 
lauded the use of the external approach in a then-majority of states, 
noting the “complications” of the internal approach and the “doubt-
ful advantage of giving full effect to local policy.”162  Today, over sixty 
years later, states have gravitated back to the internal approach. 
Compulsory registration has also evolved over time.  Early on, reg-
istration laws were enacted by municipalities and typically targeted ex-
criminal offenders more generally.163  Today, the laws focus on par-
ticular ex-offenders (typically those convicted of sex offenses)164 and 
have been enacted by all fifty states and the District of Columbia, go-
ing a long way toward achieving the interconnected surveillance sys-
tem envisioned by the federal government.165
160 See Clark v. Gladden, 432 P.2d 182, 185 (Or. 1967) (“No state is required to 
take notice of foreign convictions . . . . Each state is free to give foreign convictions 
such force as it deems proper in the administration of local sentencing policy.”). 
161 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
162 Allen, supra note 44, at 181-82. 
163 See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text. 
164 California, the first state to require registration of sex offenders in particular, 
also requires registration of persons convicted of gang-related offenses, drug law of-
fenders, and arsonists.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.32 (West Supp. 2005) (requiring 
registration of those convicted of juvenile and adult gang offenses); id. § 457.1 (West 
1999 & Supp. 2005) (requiring registration of arsonists); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 11590 (West 1991 & Supp. 2005) (requiring registration of drug offenders).  To date, 
however, the legislature has seen fit to tie only the drug offense registration law to for-
eign convictions.  See id. § 11590(a) (adopting an internal approach and mandating 
registration if the person is convicted of an offense that “if committed or attempted in 
this state” would be covered by the statute). 
165 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of this effect, 
with an analogy made to Jeremy Bentham’s infamous, yet mythical, penal Panopticon 
with its all-seeing central tower and inspector’s lodge, see Wayne A. Logan, Federal Ha-
beas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147, 195-99 (2000) (describing how regis-
tration and community notification conscript citizens and offenders alike to achieve 
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Unlike recidivist laws, registration laws were enacted with a ready 
capacity to accommodate immigrant offenders, whether by means of 
the internal or external approach.  While at present a majority of ju-
risdictions employ an internal approach,166 it should not come as a 
surprise to see that, unlike the evolution of recidivist laws, the external 
approach is increasingly employed, prompted by legislative desire to 
broaden the net of social control over itinerant sex offenders.  New 
York, for instance, while taking an internal approach for recidivism, 
opted for the external approach when dealing with the registration of 
sex offenders moving into the state.167  In so doing, it consciously 
sought to increase the coverage of its registration law, consistent with 
the avowed remedial intent of affording greater protection to New 
York’s citizens.168  As the laws evolve, broad judicial construction of in-
ternal approach laws, such as has occurred in the District of Colum-
surveillance and social control).  Ironically, while the federal government strong-
armed the states into complying with its own registration-criteria law, it actually served 
to make their registration duties more difficult, at least with respect to federally con-
victed offenders.  This is because, as a practical matter, no registration system now ex-
ists under federal law because states, bowing to federal fiscal pressure, have fulfilled 
federal registration-related requirements.  See 42 U.S.C. § 14072(a), (c) (2000) (requir-
ing federal registration for sex offenders only if a state has not established a “minimally 
sufficient” registration regime).  As a result, the external approach is of no utility for 
federal crimes, and states like New York must undertake a “complicated” and “pains-
taking” comparison of state and federal criminal law to assess whether a person con-
victed of a federal crime must register in New York.  In re Nadel, 724 N.Y.S.2d 262, 267-
69 (Sup. Ct. 2001). 
166 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
167 The divergence might be explained by the distinct goals and effects of recidivist 
and registration laws.  Whereas registration is largely proactive, seeking to monitor of-
fenders and deter criminal activity, and costs relatively little to administer, recidivist 
laws are reactive, punishing new wrongdoing in the forum and carrying significant 
costs (i.e., increased judicial and correctional resources).  New York’s use of the exter-
nal approach for registration of sex offenders is thus perhaps attributable to its contin-
gent nature, which, while allowing for public safety, only incurs major costs when im-
migrant offenders are prosecuted and convicted for failing to register.  In addition, the 
State’s use of the more inclusive, control-oriented external approach for sex offenders 
in particular is consistent with the uniquely acute fear of, and disdain for, such offend-
ers. 
168 See In re Millan, 730 N.Y.S.2d 392, 398 (2001) (emphasizing the court’s respon-
sibility to construe the registration law to achieve the legislative objective of public pro-
tection), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. People v. Millan, 743 N.Y.S.2d 872 (2002); see 
also, e.g., Jeremy Pawlowski, Sex Offender Fights Registery [sic], ALBUQUERQUE J., July 7, 
2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 10663982 (describing the determination of authori-
ties to require the registration of a new resident, despite statutory exception, because 
the resident was required to register in his former state of residence). 
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bia,169 will likely become more common, serving to increase the 
bounds of state social control. 
Taken together, the current assemblage of registration and recidi-
vist laws provides a prime example of horizontal federalism, driven by 
the unique policy concerns presented by itinerant criminal offenders.  
Unlike the civil justice system, which is chary of embracing foreign 
outcomes due to concern over the normative policy differences 
among states,170 the criminal justice system is quite willing to lend 
them weight.  In so doing, states are obliged to undertake a unique 
interpretive enterprise, largely unknown to conflict of laws practice 
and jurisprudence.171  Using an adjudicative approach akin to that 
mandated in the vertical federalism context by Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,172 whereby federal courts in civil diversity-of-citizenship cases 
employ the substantive law of the state in which they sit,173 state crimi-
nal courts interpret and apply the criminal laws of other states. 
This parallel with Erie, however instructive, is problematic though 
because it understates the actual complexity and ramifications of state 
interconnection.  With recidivist and registration laws, unlike the typi-
cal federal civil diversity suit,174 the interpreting court is geographically 
169 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. 
170 See, e.g., White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002) (eschew-
ing consideration of foreign tort recoveries in punitive damages analysis, citing the 
concern over difficulty in identifying whether the behavior was unlawful in the forum 
and the fact that “the variation in policies of punishment, even where the conduct is 
unlawful in all states, amounts to an important distinction in policy”).  For a discussion 
of this asymmetry in judicial consideration of extraterritorial wrongdoing relative to 
punitive damage awards and recidivist sentences, see Logan, supra note 40, at 1627-35. 
171 The uniqueness of the enterprise is evidenced in the leading treatise in the 
field, which dedicates less than two pages to the general issue of sister-state enforce-
ment and interpretation of penal law judgments and claims.  EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., 
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 3.17 to .18 (4th ed. 2004). 
172 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
173 Under Erie, when neither the Constitution nor a federal statute controls the 
claim, federal courts are constrained to apply the substantive law of the state in which 
they sit, yet follow federal rules on questions of procedure.  Id. at 78, 80.  Prior to Erie, 
federal courts in diversity cases endeavored to cobble together a nationally uniform 
federal common law.  In rejecting this effort, the Erie Court noted that “[i]n attempt-
ing to promote uniformity of law throughout the United States, the doctrine had pre-
vented uniformity in the administration of the law of the State.”  Id. at 75. 
174 While most often federal courts interpret and apply the substantive law of the 
state in which they sit, exceptions do arise.  For instance, in a choice-of-law situation a 
federal court will defer to the forum state’s relevant law, which can in turn require ap-
plication of the law of another jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Limbach Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. 
Co., 396 F.3d 358, 361-62 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming application of Pennsylvania con-
tracts law on the basis of Virginia’s choice-of-law rules). 
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distinct from the foreign court where the underlying conviction oc-
curred, which can present unique challenges.175  In addition, the par-
allel risks obscuring an important distinction:  unlike in diversity suits, 
where the federal court invokes the law of the jurisdiction in which it 
sits, state criminal courts applying registration and recidivist laws ef-
fectuate the laws of other states.  As a consequence, the criminal laws 
of respective states cast, as the California Supreme Court recently put 
it, “shadow[s]” over one another,176 affecting outcomes well beyond 
their territorial domains.  These “shadows” raise important questions 
touching on policy and practice and have a very real impact on the 
liberty of individuals who, as is their right,177 can and do move from 
one state to another.178 It is to these issues that the discussion now 
turns. 
II.  THE CHALLENGES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTERCONNECTION 
The varied approaches discussed above at once bespeak the “fifty-
labs” benefits of federalism, and, as states independently seek to hold 
migrating ex-offenders accountable for their past misconduct else-
where, some of its problematic effects.  Regardless of whether a state 
employs an internal or external approach, or uses the foreign convic-
tion for assessing recidivism or requiring registration, criminal justice 
175 As a result of this distance, the state criminal court is not only less likely to be 
familiar with the law, interpretative tenets, and practice of the foreign jurisdiction, but 
also less likely to benefit from the input of lawyers’ counsel because they are not 
schooled in the foreign state’s law and practice.  At the same time, this deficit is not 
ameliorated, given the lack of any right to appeal adverse determinations to the for-
eign court, and the diminished pressure on the forum court to “get it right” stemming 
from the monitoring effect that naturally exists when the court interprets and applies 
its indigenous law in the full view of the local bench and bar. 
176 People v. Laino, 87 P.3d 27, 40 (Cal.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 146 (2004). 
177 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999) (“[T]he ‘right to re-
move from one place to another according to inclination’ is ‘an attribute of personal 
liberty’ protected by the Constitution.” (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 
(1900))); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (“[T]he nature of our Fed-
eral Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all 
citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by 
statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”). 
178 The right to travel can of course be lawfully restricted by state-mandated proba-
tion and parole conditions.  The discussion here, while not necessarily affected by this 
distinction, primarily focuses on individuals not subject to such restrictions.  See Smith 
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003) (distinguishing probationers from ex-offenders subject 
to sex offender registration, in that the latter “are free to move where they wish and to 
live and work as other citizens, with no supervision”). 
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interconnection carries with it an array of significant practical chal-
lenges and consequences. 
A.  Practical Challenges 
Before a state can utilize a foreign disposition, it must surmount a 
variety of practical challenges.  The most immediate challenge stems 
from the need to secure and interpret the records of foreign courts, 
which are often less than crystal clear.  As one court put it, consulta-
tion of conviction records creates a “Pandora’s box” of judicial archi-
val work and reconstruction.179  At times it can be hard to answer the 
fundamental question of whether the foreign conviction resulted in a 
felony-level disposition,180 a process often made even more difficult by 
ambiguous or incomplete records.181
Even when the records themselves do not pose a problem, courts 
(especially when employing the internal approach) face the challenge 
of simultaneously interpreting the criminal laws and procedures of 
other states and their own, a process complicated when foreign con-
victions are aged, possibly requiring the interpretation of decades-old 
statutes and supporting legislative commentary from other states.  The 
judicial resources consumed by such interstate statutory interpretation 
ultimately implicate not just efficiency182 but also distributive justice 
concerns.183
179 Peacock v. Texas, 876 F. Supp. 865, 868 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 
180 See William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth 
Amendment Equations—Warrantless Entries into Premises:  The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 
38 U. KAN. L. REV. 439, 508 (1990) (noting that the felony/misdemeanor distinction is 
uncertain because “[i]n many jurisdictions the same conduct can be either a misde-
meanor or felony depending on how it is prosecuted or depending on the institution 
to which the offender is sentenced”).  For more on the indistinct lines, both historic 
and contemporary, distinguishing felonies and misdemeanors, see United States v. Wat-
son, 423 U.S. 411, 438-40 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing the substantive 
changes in the kinds of crimes deemed felonies and misdemeanors); JEROME HALL, 
THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 300-01 (1935) (exploring historical distinctions between felo-
nies and misdemeanors). 
181 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text; see also Quentin Brogdon, Admis-
sibility of Criminal Convictions in Civil Cases, 61 TEX. B.J. 1112, 1116-17 (1998) (noting 
that “criminal records are in abysmally poor shape across the country, and often inac-
cessible even to the law enforcement officials who need them”). 
182 Cf. Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1756 (2005) (rejecting consideration 
of a prior foreign nation conviction in part because it would require judges and prose-
cutors “[t]o somehow weed out inappropriate foreign convictions,” a task that is “not 
easy for those not versed in foreign laws to accomplish”).  For more on the inefficien-
cies imposed on legal systems as a result of having to learn and apply varied legal 
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These difficulties, in turn, exacerbate ongoing concerns over re-
cidivist enhancement laws in particular.  While commentators have 
long questioned these laws on moral and philosophical grounds,184 at-
tention of late has focused on the means by which enhancement eli-
gibility determinations are reached.  Today, the prevailing view is that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey185 requires that 
the existence of a prior conviction need not be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt nor proven to the satisfaction of a jury.186  While a 
handful of states have seen fit to extend such rights to defendants,187 
the vast majority have not, leaving it to the courts to determine 
whether enhancement based on a prior conviction is in order.188
norms, see Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 
(2002). 
183 Cf. Mitchell v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 499 (C.C.D. Me. 
1843) (Story, J.) (rejecting the requirement that federal suits be brought in state court 
because it “may most materially interfere with the convenience of their own courts, 
and the rights of their own citizens, and be attended with great expense to the state, as 
well as great delays in the administration of justice”). 
184 See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.6.2, at 465-66 
(1978) (questioning the propriety of recidivist enhancement laws in liberal society); 
Markus D. Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 689 
(1995) (arguing that enhancement laws lack penological justification). 
185 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  While insisting that any fact that increases the penalty for 
an offense beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt, the Apprendi majority carved out an exception for “the fact of 
a prior conviction.”  Id. at 490. 
186 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 74 P.3d 349, 355-56 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (citing 
Apprendi for the proposition that the defendant is not entitled to a jury trial on habit-
ual criminal counts); State v. Smith, 75 P.3d 934, 937 (Wash. 2003) (concluding that 
prior convictions need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt). 
187 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8(g) (West 2004) (requiring proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the person accumulated two prior unrelated felony convic-
tions); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 11A (LexisNexis 2002) (entitling a defendant to a 
trial by jury on the existence of a prior conviction); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.5 (2003) 
(requiring trial by jury to find a person guilty of being a habitual felon); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-7-12 (2004 & Supp. 2005) (requiring a defendant to be informed of her 
right to a trial by jury on the issue of whether she is the same person as alleged in the 
habitual criminal information); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-19 (LexisNexis 2000) (re-
quiring a trial by jury if the defendant does not admit to a record of previous convic-
tion). 
188 See supra note 55 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Patterson, 412 
F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2005) (deeming the characterization of a prior state convic-
tion as “violent,” justifying enhancement, a legal question for the court), cert. denied, 74 
U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2005) (No. 05-6668); United States v. Orduno-Mireles, 
405 F.3d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 2005) (deeming determination of whether a prior state 
conviction was a “crime of violence,” justifying enhancement, a legal question for the 
court). 
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In the run-of-the-mill case challenging a prior conviction, a de-
fendant might assert that she was not the individual previously con-
victed or that the supporting records are inauthentic or wrong.189  Al-
ternatively, a defendant might challenge an enhancement based on a 
prior adjudication, such as one in juvenile court, arguing that it did 
not qualify as a sufficiently reliable “conviction” under Apprendi.190
When courts look to foreign convictions, especially pursuant to 
the internal approach, however, their work is not limited to the largely 
ministerial determination of the “fact” of a prior conviction.191  In in-
ternal approach jurisdictions that focus strictly on the elements of the 
foreign offense conviction (as manifest by the verdict or plea based on 
established facts of record),192 enhancement eligibility can be a com-
plex comparative law question for the sentencing court to resolve.193  
However, in jurisdictions permitting analysis to go beyond the verdict 
or plea, a potential constitutional concern is presented because a le-
gally material, disputed fact (i.e., behavior underlying the prior con-
viction that possibly triggers the forum’s recidivist law) was not estab-
lished by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the 
defendant. 
Such constitutional concern is especially likely in the wake of 
Shepard v. United States,194 which recently limited the evidentiary record 
sentencing courts can consult when deciding if a prior conviction 
based upon a guilty plea qualifies for a mandatory sentence enhance-
ment.  Under Shepard, a court is permitted to consult only the statu-
tory definition of the crime of conviction, the charging document, the 
plea agreement and colloquy, and any specific findings by the trial 
189 See, e.g., People v. Belmares, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 400, 406-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) 
(rejecting an identity-based claim as well as the assertion that the defendant had a con-
stitutional right to a jury determination of the question). 
190 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1289 (La. 2004) (refusing to enhance 
an adult’s sentence because the prior juvenile adjudication was obtained without right 
to jury trial, thus undercutting its constitutional reliability). 
191 In external approach jurisdictions, the role of the sentencing court is essen-
tially ministerial insofar as the court’s job is to determine whether the foreign convic-
tion warranted felony status in the foreign jurisdiction. 
192 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
193 See, e.g., State v. Heath, 7 P.3d 92, 93 (Ariz. 2000) (deeming determination of 
whether a foreign felony conviction qualifies for enhancement to be a question of law 
for the court, which is unaffected by the defendant’s admission of the conviction’s ex-
istence). 
194 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005). 
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court to which the defendant assented.195  While to date only one state 
appellate court has agreed that fact-finding by courts outside the for-
mal record is constitutionally problematic (in a decision decided be-
fore Shepard),196 in the future such challenges will likely become suc-
cessful mainstays of immigrant ex-offenders who face enhancements. 
Moreover, while Shepard refused to renounce the Apprendi “prior 
conviction” exception, it did cast serious constitutional doubt upon 
it.197  Should this doubt someday evolve into the Court’s outright re-
jection of the exception, as urged by commentators,198 then the afore-
mentioned resource concerns would be amplified because juries 
would be charged with making factual determinations on all prior 
convictions (in-state and out-of-state alike).199
B.  Notice 
The aforementioned interpretive challenges, difficult enough for 
the legal system itself, can present significant problems for migratory 
ex-offenders, who typically are not schooled in the niceties of statutory 
interpretation and construction.  While of course it is axiomatic that 
ignorance of the law does not qualify as an excuse,200 in theory requir-
195 Id. at 1263.  In Shepard, the Court rejected the government’s argument that sen-
tencing courts should be able to consider police reports or evidence advanced by po-
lice in applying for criminal complaints in the earlier case.  Id. at 1260. 
196 See State v. Ortega, 84 P.3d 935, 939 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that “un-
derlying facts [of a prior Texas conviction] that were not found by the trier of fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt may not be used to increase the penalty of a subsequent con-
viction”), review denied, 119 P.3d 852 (Wash. 2005). 
197 See Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1264 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that past votes 
of a majority of current Justices signal a willingness to abandon the prior conviction 
exception). 
198 See, e.g., Colleen P. Murphy, The Use of Prior Convictions After Apprendi, 37 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 973, 978 (2004) (arguing “that the Constitution guarantees proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt and a right to a jury trial” to determine the existence of a 
prior conviction). 
199 If the prior conviction exception is disavowed, more states might be encour-
aged to adopt the external approach, which requires less in the way of proof for the 
government:  it need only convince the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the prior conviction exists and warranted felony status in the foreign jurisdiction. 
200 See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (“The general rule that 
ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to a criminal prosecution is 
deeply rooted in the American legal system.”).  The pragmatic reason for this view was 
eloquently captured by Justice Holmes: 
It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not 
have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit [ignorance or mistake 
as an] excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has 
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ing citizens to learn the nation’s patchwork of criminal laws,201 notice 
nevertheless remains a prerequisite of due process.202
Notice difficulties are perhaps most pronounced with registra-
tion,203 which, depending on the jurisdiction, provides as little as two 
days to determine whether a newcomer must register.204  When an in-
dividual moves to an external approach state, the task is easy enough:  
if the foreign jurisdiction required registration, then the newly 
adopted state does so as well.  With internal approach states, however, 
the individual is forced to undertake what is possibly a quite complex 
task in statutory interpretation.205  Moreover, the task is complicated 
determined to make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is 
rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 48 (Little, Brown & Co. 1948) 
(1881); see also Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtu-
ous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 128 (1997) (discussing the moral underpinnings of the “mis-
take of law” doctrine). 
201 Alexis de Tocqueville, writing 150 years ago, remarked that it was “frightening 
to see how much diverse knowledge and discernment [federalism] assumes on the part 
of the governed.”  ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 164 (J.P. Mayer 
ed., George Lawrence trans., Doubleday & Co. 1969) (1850).  With the dramatic pro-
liferation in state, federal, and local criminal laws in recent years, one can say with con-
fidence that de Tocqueville would be impressed all the more.  See generally Robert C. 
Ellickson, Taming Leviathan:  Will the Centralizing Tide of the Twentieth Century Continue 
into the Twenty-First?, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 105-06 (2000) (noting the marked increase 
in laws by comparing New Haven, Connecticut’s laws in the twentieth century to those 
in the nineteenth). 
202 See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating that a law so 
unclear in its substance that citizens “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application . . . violates the first essential of due process 
of law”).  This is not to say that the law-abiding public at large is especially well-
informed about the criminal law.  See JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTA J. STALANS, 
PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 35-52 (1997) (discussing research 
highlighting a lack of public familiarity with criminal laws and punishments); William 
J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1871 (2000) (“Ordinary people do 
not have the time or training to learn the contents of criminal codes . . . . Criminal 
codes therefore do not and cannot speak to ordinary citizens directly.”). 
203 See People v. Franklin, 975 P.2d 30, 33 (Cal. 1999) (stating that notice is espe-
cially important with registration, “which, to ensure effective compliance, must give 
clear notice to all registrants of their responsibilities so that laypersons such as defendant 
can readily understand and properly discharge them”); State v. Chun, 76 P.3d 935, 942 
n.12 (Haw. 2003) (urging the legislature to “clearly enumerate the statutory offenses 
that trigger the registration requirement”). 
204 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178E(g) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) (requiring 
registration within two days of moving into the commonwealth). 
205 See, e.g., Creekmore v. Attorney Gen., 341 F. Supp. 2d 648, 666 (E.D. Tex. 2004) 
(noting that “determining whether elements of one offense are substantially similar to 
elements of another offense is a difficult task,” especially for an “untrained layman”); 
Roe v. Attorney Gen., No. 99-2706-H, 1999 WL 1260188, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 
23, 1999) (discussing the difficulty of discerning whether a Florida crime constituted a 
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by various special features contained in state laws, including registra-
tion requirements triggered by broad statutory language;206 the varied 
use of juvenile convictions;207 and major differences in how many years 
into the past jurisdictions will consider registerable offenses.208  So 
challenging is the task that Texas has designated a particular agency 
with making registration eligibility determinations, requiring that 
agency to make available its accumulated wisdom of criteria and de-
terminations, and has consolidated all registrant appeals in a single 
county court jurisdiction.209
The consequences of getting this legal analysis wrong are signifi-
cant. Despite the fact that some state registration laws have been in-
terpreted to contain no scienter requirement,210 prosecution at the 
felony level can result from a first offense.211  Moreover, failure-to-
register convictions, even though predicated upon the nominally civil 
requirement of registration, can serve as a basis for future recidivism-
based assessments and result in extended prison terms.212
In 1997, mindful of the variability of state registration laws and 
wishing to enhance registration coverage overall, Congress specified 
that states wishing to qualify for federal funds (1) require registrants 
“like offense,” requiring registration under Massachusetts law).  Twenty years ago, Meir 
Dan-Cohen drew a distinction between “decision rules,” addressed to judges and in-
tended to guide decisions on the law’s application, and “conduct rules,” addressed to 
potential offenders.  Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules:  On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 625-26 (1984).  Dan-Cohen notes, 
however, that the respective rule types can be wedded in a single statute, id. at 633-36, 
which would appear to be the case with recidivist and registration laws, because they at 
once speak to the judiciary and the lay public.  But cf. Dru Stevenson, Toward a New 
Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1535, 1542 (2004) (offering a de-
fense of legal inscrutability more generally, based on the idea that laws “are addressed 
to the state itself, and not to the general public”). 
206 See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
208 While many states use ten years as the cutoff, California extends back over sixty 
years and Missouri over twenty-five years.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(2)(D)(i) 
(West 1999 & Supp 2005) (extending back to July 1, 1944); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
589.400.1(1)–(5) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005) (extending back to July 1, 1979). 
209 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. 
210 See, e.g., State v. Young, 535 S.E.2d 380, 384 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (finding no 
scienter requirement in North Carolina law); State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 583 (Ohio 
1998) (finding no scienter requirement in Ohio law). 
211 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.835 (2004) (making failure-to-register a felony 
offense); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3824 (2001 & Supp. 2005) (same). 
212 See People v. Carmony, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 376-78 (Ct. App. 2005) (surveying 
state laws with regard to failure-to-register convictions and their effects on recidivism-
based extended prison terms). 
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to report any intended changes in state residence, (2) inform regis-
trants of their duty to comply with registration requirements in their 
new state residence, and (3) notify the new state of residence of the 
registrant’s anticipated move.213  To date, however, jurisdictions have 
been slow to take such steps, and constitutional challenges are only 
now surfacing in appellate courts. 
In State v. Bryant,214 for instance, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina addressed the due process claim of a carnival worker who, 
while subject to lifelong registration when living in South Carolina, 
failed to register in North Carolina when he decided to remain there 
while on tour.  Neither North nor South Carolina, however, informed 
him that he was duty-bound to register in North Carolina upon his 
move.215  The Bryant court reversed a prior holding of the Court of 
Appeals that the North Carolina Legislature unconstitutionally failed 
to “adequately address the reality of our mobile society, in which peo-
ple frequently move across state lines,”216 and rejected application of 
Lambert v. California.217
According to the court, North Carolina’s registration requirement 
materially differed from that invalidated in Lambert, which applied 
only in a municipality, not statewide, and targeted all convicted felons, 
not only sex offenders.218  Moreover, to the extent Lambert pertained, 
it applied only to conduct that is “wholly passive” and where no under-
lying circumstances existed “which might move one to inquire as to 
the necessity of registration.”219  The instant appeal, however, was 
“rich with circumstances” sufficient to put Bryant, when in South 
Carolina, on notice of the need to register in North Carolina: 
213 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(5) (2000).  For an example of a state law 
to this effect, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130(4)(a)(ix) (West Supp. 2005) 
(“Offenders required to register in Washington, who move to another state, . . . shall 
register . . . with the new state within ten days after establishing residence.”). 
214 614 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. 2005). 
215 North Carolina law provided that notice of the state’s registration requirement 
be given only to individuals prior to their release from its own prisons.  N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-208.8 (2003).  For its part, South Carolina only required that a registrant 
provide written notice “within ten days of the change of address to a new state to the 
[South Carolina] county sheriff with whom the person last registered.”  S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 23-3-460 (Supp. 2004). 
216 State v. Bryant, 594 S.E.2d 202, 207 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 614 S.E.2d 479 
(N.C. 2005). 
217 355 U.S. 225 (1957).  For discussion of Lambert, see supra note 106 and accom-
panying text. 
218 Bryant, 614 S.E.2d at 487. 
219 Id. at 488 (quoting Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228-29). 
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First, defendant had actual notice of his lifelong duty to register with the 
State of South Carolina as a convicted sex offender.  Second, defendant 
had actual notice that he must register as a convicted sex offender in 
South Carolina for “similar offenses from other jurisdictions” and had a 
duty to inform South Carolina officials of a move out of the state . . . . 
Third, defendant himself informed [South Carolina] law enforcement 
authorities that he had been convicted of a sex offense in Florida.
220
These case-specific circumstances, the Bryant court held, coupled 
with the “pervasiveness” of the nation’s sex offender registration laws, 
sufficed to “lead the reasonable individual to inquire of a duty to reg-
ister in any state upon relocation.”221  Given the omnipresence of reg-
istration laws, the Bryant court reasoned, “it would be nonsensical to 
allow sex offenders to escape their duty to register by moving to an-
other state that has not provided them with actual notice of their duty 
to register, and then claim ignorance of the law.”222
The Ohio Court of Appeals reached a similar result in State v. Beck-
ley,223 where both Ohio and Washington failed to notify a former 
Washington resident of the need to register in Ohio upon his arrival 
there.  Distinguishing Lambert, the court also held that it would be 
“nonsensical to find that a sex offender could escape his reporting re-
quirements by moving to Ohio, a state that does not have notice re-
quirements for out-of-state sex offenders, and then claim ignorance or 
no notice.”224  The court added: 
If a sex offender moves from a state in which he has been required to 
register, it is logical and imperative that the offender inquire into the 
registration laws of the new state.  A sex offender should not escape 
criminal responsibility when he violates one state’s laws of registration 
and then claim ignorance of another state’s laws.  The classification of a 
sex offender does not disappear when the offender crosses state lines.  
All fifty states have enacted sex offender registration laws in varying de-
grees in compliance with [federal mandates].
225
Whatever the outcomes of future challenges, and regardless of 
state efforts to inform immigrant offenders of the need to register, no-
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 Id.; see also People v. Patterson, 708 N.Y.S.2d 815, 826 n.5 (Crim. Ct. 2001) (dis-
tinguishing Lambert on the rationale that, unlike the municipal law condemned there, 
modern registration laws are enacted by states and are in effect nationwide). 
223 No. 83254, 2004 WL 1277358 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 2004), appeal denied, 816 
N.E.2d 1080 (Ohio 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2548 (2005). 
224 Id. at *3. 
225 Id. at *4. 
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tice concerns will persist.226  This is because even when general notice 
of the registration requirement is given, whether by registrants’ for-
mer or future states of residence,227 registrants (and law enforcement 
in the new state) are still faced with a complex interpretive legal task.  
Even more problematic, under the internal approach, individuals not 
previously required to register in a foreign state might, unbeknownst 
to them, be required to do so in their newly adopted state.  Finally, 
exacerbating the foregoing, courts will be inclined to deem registra-
tion failures as a mistake of law, not likely warranting a defense in 
prosecutions.228
Similar challenges are faced by individuals convicted of a felony in 
their newly adopted state, who face the specter of enhancement on 
the basis of a prior foreign state conviction.  To be sure, the conse-
quences are less immediate with recidivism, inasmuch as the inter-
jurisdictional analysis is triggered only upon conviction for a new fel-
ony, not a mere change of domicile as with registration.  However, as 
notice is a prerequisite to the fair enforcement of the criminal law 
generally, so too should notice apply to application of sentence en-
hancements triggered by violations of the underlying substantive 
criminal law.  If a crime classified as a misdemeanor in a foreign state 
can be treated by the forum as a felony for purposes of assessing re-
cidivism,229 or the foreign state would not count deferred or probated 
adjudications,230 or a nolo contendere plea,231 or a prior juvenile dis-
position,232 notice is implicated.233  Moreover, to the extent that recidi-
226 For a rare instance of a successful notice-based claim, see State v. Tippett, 624 
N.W.2d 176, 178 (Iowa 2001) (reversing the conviction of a former Illinois registrant 
prosecuted for failure to register in Iowa). 
227 The authority of one state to impose a registration requirement on another it-
self presents an intriguing question of extraterritorial authority, which to date has 
failed to raise judicial concern.  See People v. Smith, 86 P.3d 348, 354 (Cal. 2004) (up-
holding the authority of California to impose a reporting duty on registrants wishing to 
leave the state and likening the requirement to a preexisting tax or child support obli-
gation); State v. Wigglesworth, 63 P.3d 1185, 1190 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that 
the Oregon reporting requirement and its violation were “triggered by defendant’s 
action in Oregon and, as such, had no extraterritorial effect”). 
228 See, e.g., People v. Baker, No. C039458, 2003 WL 22422414, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Oct. 24, 2003) (holding that a registrant’s “belief regarding his legal status was a mis-
take of law,” not a justifying defense).  See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW §§ 13.01-.03, at 165-77 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing mistakes of law). 
229 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
230 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
231 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
232 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. 
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vism-based enhancements are predicated on deterrence and recidi-
vists calculate the risks, costs, and benefits of committing a new 
crime,234 practical concern should arise over the uncertain quality of 
internal approach laws.235  Finally, such uncertainty inevitably influ-
ences plea bargains, as the leverage of prosecutors is enhanced.236  
233 Emblematic of this concern, states typically require that the prosecution give 
advance notice of its intent to use a prior foreign conviction for enhancement.  See, 
e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-108 (2003) (“[I]f the prosecution seeks treatment of 
the accused as a persistent felony offender, notice of that fact must be given . . . .”); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(III) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004) (“[I]f notice . . . is given 
the defendant prior to the commencement of trial, a defendant may be sentenced to 
an extended term of imprisonment.”); cf. Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1753 
(2005) (rejecting consideration of a prior foreign nation conviction because, inter alia, 
“it would leave those previously convicted in a foreign court . . . uncertain about their 
legal obligations”). 
234 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(6) (McKinney 1998) (identifying as a goal of 
recidivist enhancement “insur[ing] the public safety by preventing the commission of 
offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized”).  As Paul Rob-
inson has observed, notice at once implicates due process and deterrence concerns: 
A central function of the criminal law is to publicly announce what the crimi-
nal law commands, both what it prohibits and what it requires.  The function 
is central for two reasons.  First, people must know the rules if the deterrence 
threat of the sanction is to have an effect:  The law cannot deter people from 
engaging in conduct that they do not know it prohibits, or compel people to 
engage in conduct that they do not know it requires.  Second, notions of fair-
ness require that a person have a fair opportunity to know the law’s com-
mands before being punished for failing to obey them. 
Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 159, 163 (1994). 
235 See United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 295 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J., dis-
senting) (decrying the lack of notice to those subject to a federal firearms ban, and 
concluding that when a law is not patent, it is “not a deterrent.  It is a trap”).  More-
over, while perhaps rare, the uncertainty noted might discourage migration and thus 
socially and economically advantageous activities.  For instance, writing with respect to 
the uncertainties of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, one au-
thor commented: 
Neither the RICO statute nor its judicial interpretations provide equivalent 
clarity or specificity.  In this respect, uncertainty also imposes costs.  In many 
cases, when the outcome is uncertain, a prudent defendant may assume the 
worst and proceed from there.  This creates an incentive to avoid risky situa-
tions through extra investigation and settlement expenditures. 
Michael A. DiMedio, A Deterrence Theory Analysis of Corporate RICO Liability for “Fraud in 
the Sale of Securities,” 1 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 158-59 (1994); see also Richard Craswell 
& John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 298-
99 (1986) (noting that legal uncertainty can lead to undue risk aversion and thus 
suboptimal social gain). 
236 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978) (upholding the au-
thority of a prosecutor to threaten pursuit of recidivist enhancement if a defendant 
refuses to plead guilty to the initial charge); see also Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 
2531, 2542 (2004) (noting that there is “no shortage of in terrorem tools at prosecutors’ 
disposal”); Lynn N. Hughes, Don’t Make a Federal Case Out of It:  The Constitution and the 
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This informational deficit, in turn, is not likely remedied by judicial 
involvement, given that courts undertake a highly particularized, case-
by-case, post-hoc analysis unlikely to be of much utility to immigrating 
offenders.237
C.  Unequal Treatment 
Even assuming that registrants and recidivists are able to accu-
rately assess the impact of the applicable laws in their newly adopted 
states, the laws themselves threaten unequal treatment.  The effect is 
especially pronounced with the external approach.  When forum 
states defer to outcomes reached in foreign states with significant 
variations in substantive laws, punishments, and procedural rights, 
otherwise similarly situated individuals can be treated unequally.238
With respect to registration, the notable idiosyncrasies of state 
laws are permitted to affect outcomes in other states.  For instance, if 
an individual moves from South Carolina to one of the fifteen other 
states using an external test for registration, the Palmetto State’s un-
usually broad gamut of registerable offenses will come into play (in-
cluding, for example, peeping, voyeurism, and buggery).239  Similar 
scenarios arise if one moves to an external state after having been 
convicted of obscenity or second degree prostitution (involving 
adults) in Alabama;240 adultery in Kansas;241 bestiality in South Da-
kota;242 a “crime against nature” in Idaho and Louisiana;243 or consen-
Nationalization of Crime, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 161 (1997) (containing the observation 
of a U.S. district judge urging that “[w]e need to limit the range and number of laws a 
prosecutor has to use”). 
237 Nor are the judicial efforts likely to be of much use to the jurisprudence of ei-
ther the foreign state or the forum, given that the former is not obliged to take note of 
the construction, and the latter typically has little ongoing need for the construction of 
another state’s laws.  In Erie situations, on the other hand, states benefit from federal 
court interpretations of state laws and constitutions.  See Barry Friedman, Under the Law 
of Federal Jurisdiction:  Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1211, 1237-41 (2004) (surveying scholarship on “cross-fertilization”). 
238 In such circumstances, there arises another parallel with Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  While the Erie doctrine was motivated out of uniformity 
concerns, see supra notes 172-73, it, like the state-state use of the external approach, has 
resulted in unequal outcomes.  See Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp:  
The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1991) (noting that Erie 
replaced vertical forum-shopping concerns with horizontal forum-shopping concerns). 
239 2005 S.C. Acts 141 (amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430(C)(10), (12), (14), 
(17), (18) (Supp. 2004)). 
240 2005 Ala. Laws 301 (amending ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994)). 
241 KAN. STAT. § 22-4902(a)(5)(A) (2003). 
242 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-30(14), 22-22-31 (Supp. 2005). 
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sual sex between minors in Connecticut.244  A conviction for possess-
ing child pornography can have a similar effect in many states,245 as 
can one for indecent exposure,246 despite judicial concerns expressed 
over the requirement.247  Some states require registration for non-
sexual offenses, for example, involuntary manslaughter (Kansas)248 or 
robbery, homicide, and aggravated assault (Montana),249 and do not 
limit registerable offenses to felonies.250  Finally, most but not all states 
require juveniles to register251 and can vary significantly in the length 
of time during which registration is required.252
Under such circumstances, the external approach results in two 
possible kinds of unequal treatment.  The first involves immigrants 
from states with narrower registration eligibility criteria; they, unlike 
the immigrant from, say, South Carolina, will not be subject to regis-
tration because it was not required by the foreign state from which 
they migrated.  The second arises when an offender in the forum state 
is not required to register as a result of being convicted of an offense 
(e.g., peeping), yet the newcomer is so required, again because of the 
idiosyncratic nature of the foreign state’s registration law.  Alterna-
tively, the duration of registration can be made lengthier for newcom-
ers if the forum state ties the newcomer’s period of registration to the 
243 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8304(a) (Supp. 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
15:541(14.1), :542 (2005). 
244 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-250(2)(A), -250(5), -251(a) (West Supp. 2005). 
245 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.61.127, 12.63.010, 12.63.100(6)(C)(v) (2004) (in-
cluding possession of child pornography as a registerable offense); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
589.400(1)–(2) (West Supp. 2005) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-30(5), 22-22-
31 (Supp. 2005) (same). 
246 See, e.g., 2005 N.D. Laws 121 (amending N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-12.1, 12.1-
32-15(1)(e) (1997 & Supp. 2005)) (defining indecent exposure as a class A misde-
meanor and requiring registration); 2005 S.C. Acts 141 (amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 
23-3-430(C)(14) (Supp. 2004) (including indecent exposure as a registerable of-
fense)). 
247 See State v. Chun, 76 P.3d 935, 939-40 (Haw. 2003) (questioning the propriety 
of using indecent exposure as a registration predicate); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 
290(a)(2)(D)(iii), (iv) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005) (adopting an external approach to 
registration, but expressly excluding indecent exposure). 
248 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(a)(2), (d)(5) (2003). 
249 2005 Mont. Laws ch. 313 (amending MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-102, -202, -401, 
46-23-502(9)(a) (2003)). 
250 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
252 Compare, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(1)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005) (re-
quiring lifetime registration), with 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9795.1(a) (West Supp. 
2005) (requiring that non-aggravated offenders register for ten years). 
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duration imposed by the state left behind.253  In each such situation, 
registration, with its direct254 and collateral burdens (including possi-
bly community notification, with its litany of negative conse-
quences),255 is driven by the geographic happenstance of where the 
foreign conviction occurred, leading to unequal outcomes in the fo-
rum state.256
Similar effects can occur with recidivist laws.  For instance, New 
York law, characterized by an internal approach, contains the unusual 
provision that prior foreign convictions be evaluated for recidivist eli-
gibility in terms of the sentence authorized in New York at the time of 
the subsequent crime, whereas prior New York convictions are as-
sessed in terms of the time of the prior conviction.257  As a result, prior 
foreign convictions, unlike domestic ones, can possibly benefit from a 
“downgrade.”258  On the other hand, Alaska mandates sentence en-
hancement for persons convicted elsewhere of a lewd and lascivious 
253 Under Pennsylvania law, for instance, an immmigrating ex-offender previously 
subject to community notification in another state remains subject to registration for 
the durational extent the other state requires, or ten years (Pennsylvania’s duration), 
whichever is greater.  42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9795.2(b)(4)(v) (West Supp. 2005).  
As a result, an individual moving to Pennsylvania from one of the many states reflex-
ively imposing notification on all registrants, and imposing lifetime registration, will 
experience a significantly extended period of registration (and notification) compared 
to an indigenous Pennsylvanian.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0435 (West Supp. 
2005) (subjecting all registrants to notification and requiring them to maintain regis-
tration for life). 
254 Such effects include, inter alia, significant variations in duration of registration, 
the intervals at which registration information must be updated and the means by 
which it must occur, prohibitions of name changes, and the requirement that personal 
identification cards be carried.  See Logan, supra note 165, at 183-86 (surveying a variety 
of direct effects of registration requirements).  To this list of burdens can be added 
strict limits on where registrants can live.  See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 723 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (upholding against constitutional challenges an Iowa law that prohibits reg-
istrants from living within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility). 
255 See Logan, supra note 165, at 182-207 (noting the many significant collateral 
consequences of registration and notification, including stigma and limited housing 
and employment opportunities). 
256 Hendrix v. Taylor, 579 S.E.2d 320 (S.C. 2003), provides a variation on this sce-
nario.  There an immigrant with a Colorado conviction was required under South 
Carolina law to register annually for life, even though Colorado would possibly allow 
registration to cease in five years.  Id. at 322, 325. 
257 See People v. Walker, 623 N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 1993) (interpreting New York’s pe-
nal code defining a second felony offender). 
258 People v. Pacheco, 426 N.Y.S.2d 57, 61 (App. Div. 1980), aff’d, 421 N.E.2d 114 
(N.Y. 1981).  According to the court, “[t]he statute concededly works a harsher result 
on those with a prior New York felony conviction,” but the distinction is justified by a 
proper legislative desire “to be more severe with those who have consistently violated 
the laws of this State.”  Id. 
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act upon a child, yet refuses to enhance sentences based on prior simi-
lar in-state convictions.259
More commonly, disparity arises with the external approach.  In 
states using this approach, decisions by foreign jurisdictions to punish 
an offense at the felony level can compel that the conviction be 
counted in assessing recidivism in the forum state, even when the of-
fense would not be punished as harshly (and trigger recidivist status) 
in the forum.260  Variations in the treatment of juveniles and pleas of 
nolo contendere can also lead to unequal treatment when a state de-
fers to another state’s use of such dispositions, yet does not do so with 
respect to its indigenous offenders.261
Finally, with both registration and recidivist enhancement laws, 
varied procedural rules and rights among states come to have extra-
territorial significance.  Variations with respect to such matters as the 
requirement of indictment,262 jury size and unanimity,263 and even ap-
plication of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule,264 can influ-
ence underlying outcomes and hence impact the criminal histories of 
individuals who migrate.  Again, disparity can arise in at least two dis-
tinct respects:  first, among individuals who migrate from foreign 
states with varied protections, and as a result potentially bring differ-
ent outcomes; second, when the forum state defers to the disposition 
of the foreign state, yet would provide more protection to its indige-
nous criminal defendants. 
259 See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(4)(B) (2004) (“[A] felony conviction in an-
other jurisdiction making it a crime to commit any lewd and lascivious act upon a  
child . . . is a prior conviction for sexual felony.”).  The provision was prompted by a 
judicial decision refusing to count a defendant’s prior California conviction for lewd 
and lascivious conduct, because that California law swept more broadly than the analo-
gous Alaska law.  Scroggins v. State, 951 P.2d 442, 444 (Alaska. Ct. App. 1998). 
260 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
261 See, e.g., State v. Vizcaino-Roque, 800 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (count-
ing a prior Florida nolo contendere-based conviction that would not be recognized in 
Missouri). 
262 See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporation of 
the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1476-77 (2000) (discussing the decreasing use 
of grand juries). 
263 See Robert H. Miller, Comment, Six of One Is Not a Dozen of the Other:  A Reexami-
nation of Williams v. Florida and the Size of State Criminal Juries, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 
625-31 & n.42 (1998) (discussing the increasing use of petit juries comprised of fewer 
than twelve jurors and experimentation with non-unanimous juries). 
264 Compare, e.g., State v. Duntz, 613 A.2d 224, 228 (Conn. 1992) (rejecting the 
“good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule), with Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 
S.W.2d 684, 688-89 (Ky. 1992) (embracing the “good faith” exception). 
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Under each of the foregoing scenarios, while as a technical matter 
the individual is not being “punished” again,265 the effect can be the 
same.  With registration and recidivist laws, the decisions of a foreign 
state function to regulate and affect the liberty of ex-residents as they 
migrate elsewhere.266  A residual legal world is thus created with out-
comes, sometimes quite unfairly, turning on the legal regime of the 
jurisdiction the individual has left behind.267
D.  Replication and the “Frozen-in-Amber” Effect 
In addition to its significant institutional and personal effects, in-
terconnection has broad societal consequences.  In particular, the use 
by states of one another’s prior criminal convictions can serve to rep-
licate temporally and geographically contingent aspects of substantive 
criminal law, punishment, and procedure. 
Temporal contingency is most evident with respect to the substan-
tive law, which, in tandem with prosecutorial priorities, typically re-
flects the public sentiment of its time of origin and application.  As a 
265 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) (holding that registration and 
community notification do not qualify as punishment and thus do not violate the Ex 
Post Facto Clause); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995) (noting that a re-
cidivism-based enhancement is not an additional punishment for a prior conviction 
but rather “a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggra-
vated offense because a repetitive one”); cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 
(1997) (condoning the use of a prior criminal conviction as an evidentiary basis to jus-
tify involuntary civil commitment of “sexually violent predators”). 
266 For discussion of the propriety of extraterritorial regulation more generally, in 
the face of the traditional position rejecting it, see Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice 
and Choice of Law:  Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American 
Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992) (discussing and endorsing the traditional view 
that states should not punish their citizens for conduct that occurred in other states 
where such conduct is condoned); Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Hetero-
geneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855 (2002) (advocating a state’s au-
thority to regulate the out-of-state behavior of its citizens, in order to avoid the pros-
pect of “travel-evasion”). 
267 This of course is not to say that intrastate disparities do not result in unequal 
treatment vis-à-vis indigenous defendants.  See, e.g., Joshua Bowers, Comment, “The In-
tegrity of the Game Is Everything”:  The Problem of Geographic Disparity in Three Strikes, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1164, 1172-80 (2001) (discussing inconsistencies in the application of 
California’s “three strikes” recidivist law); Ashley Rupp, Comment, Death Penalty Prose-
cutorial Charging Decisions and County Budgetary Restrictions:  Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily 
Applied Based on County Funding?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2735, 2752-67 (2003) (discussing 
inconsistent applications of the death penalty within states due to budgeting con-
straints). 
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consequence, criminal laws are subject to “intergenerational drift,”268 
which the static, retrospective methodology typical of registration and 
recidivism fails to accommodate.269  Convictions for offenses once de-
fined differently,270 which are no longer applied or are repealed,271 or 
which themselves perhaps reflect discriminatory effects (e.g., racial 
discrimination272 or homophobia273), can be preserved and given con-
temporary force.274
268 Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the En-
forcement of Economic Legislation:  A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 221 (1965).  As 
Susan Pilcher more recently noted: 
Public perception of the magnitude of any given social harm is likely to shift 
over time in response to the changing social context.  Conduct that is re-
garded as morally neutral at one time . . . at a later date may come to be re-
garded as wrongful and deserving of community condemnation.  Similarly, 
conduct that is considered blameworthy today may easily be seen as “inno-
cent” in a more permissive era. 
Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice:  Confronting “Apparent In-
nocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1995). 
269 Of course, the criminal law itself is not static; on the contrary, it is constantly 
being added to (but rarely subtracted from).  Rather, the point is that interconnection 
gives old laws new life. 
270 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 636 S.W.2d 929, 936 (Mo. 1982) (counting a prior statu-
tory rape conviction involving a fifteen-year-old victim, notwithstanding a statutory 
change taking effect two months later revising the age to “less than fourteen”), over-
ruled on other grounds by State v. Jones, 716 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1986); State v. Sandoval, 89 
P.3d 92, 94 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (counting a prior criminal trespass conviction that 
lacked the “knowing” element, notwithstanding that the element was subsequently 
added by the legislature); State v. Frederick, 674 P.2d 136, 142-43 (Wash. 1983) 
(counting a prior grand larceny conviction, notwithstanding a statutory change that 
increased the value element triggering felony status), overruled on other grounds by 
Thompson v. State Dep’t of Licensing, 982 P.2d 601 (Wash. 1999).  But see Lee v. State, 
673 P.2d 892, 894 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting a prior grand larceny conviction 
based on a subsequent statutory change in the qualifying amount). 
271 See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 34-37 (1996) (discussing a variety of criminal laws that are no longer 
enforced). 
272 See generally CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:  A QUESTION OF COLOR 
115-18 (1993) (noting historic and contemporary laws targeting particular minority 
groups); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 84-85 (1997) (discussing post-
Civil War “Black Codes” permitting African-Americans to be singled out for prosecu-
tion). 
273 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet:  Ameri-
can Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1068-69 (1997) 
(discussing biased enforcement of criminal laws against non-heterosexuals); Robert L. 
Jacobson, Note, “Megan’s Laws” Reinforcing Old Patterns of Anti-Gay Police Harassment, 87 
GEO. L.J. 2431, 2449-50 (1999) (discussing unequal enforcement of criminal laws 
against homosexual men). 
274 See infra note 373 and accompanying text (noting that before Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003), invalidated laws criminalizing consensual adult sodomy, such con-
  
2005] HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM 309 
 
Similarly, because analysis usually focuses on the punishment im-
posed at the time of the former conviction, the laws can resist progres-
sive change in sentencing mores, replicating especially punitive times 
in the nation’s history.  This is especially the case with recidivist en-
hancements.275  Although many states are now re-thinking the draco-
nian sentences imposed in past decades,276 the retrograde mien of re-
cidivist laws functions to perpetuate past harshness and give it 
contemporary effect.277
victions would be exported and incorporated by registration laws); see also Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 579 ( “[L]aws once thought necessary and proper [can] in fact serve only 
to oppress.”). 
275 See, e.g., Elston v. State, 687 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (holding 
that a prior out-of-state conviction need only have been a felony as defined by Alabama 
law at the time of its adjudication); State v. Brooks, 968 S.W.2d 312, 313-14 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1997) (comparing Virginia and Tennessee laws from the time of the de-
fendant’s prior conviction, not as they exist at the time of enhancement); State v. Serr, 
664 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that prior convictions must have 
been felonies at the time of perpetration); see also Maier v. State, 437 N.E.2d 448, 453 
(Ind. 1982) (noting that the defendant was not entitled to have the jury instructed that 
a prior conviction, although a felony offense at the time of conviction, had been re-
duced to a misdemeanor in the interim).  This ossification effect, it bears mention, is 
not unique to interstate recidivist analysis.  See, e.g., State v. King, 336 N.W.2d 576, 580 
(Neb. 1983) (counting a prior Nebraska felony conviction for operating a motor vehi-
cle to avoid arrest notwithstanding the later statutory reduction of the crime to a mis-
demeanor). 
276 Among the most notable examples is New York’s decision to mitigate its draco-
nian “Rockefeller drug laws.”  See Joe Mahoney & Tracy Connor, State KOs Toughest 
Drug Laws, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 8, 2004, at 4 (noting that although the laws have not 
been repealed, mandatory fifteen-years-to-life sentences have been cut to eight years); 
see also Fox Butterfield, States Ease Laws on Time in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, at 
1A (noting that fiscal pressures have prompted several states to modify draconian sen-
tencing laws).  For a discussion of harsh criminal law-related measures enacted in re-
cent years, see Wayne A. Logan, “Democratic Despotism” and Constitutional Constraint:  An 
Empirical Analysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 439, 
468-75 (2003).  For an overview of the shifting tides of penal theory and sentencing 
policy more generally, see Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory 
and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233 (2005). 
277 This effect is especially pronounced in jurisdictions that focus on the extent to 
which a prior offense was “punishable,” focusing not on the actual sentence imposed 
or actually served, but rather on what the legislature authorized.  See, e.g., Welch v. 
State, 828 N.E.2d 433, 439 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (observing that the term served was 
less important than the “term for which the convicted person might have been impris-
oned”).  Such a focus ignores individualized judicial determinations in actual cases 
warranting mitigation and fails to accommodate the common tendency of legislatures 
to set punishments at an extreme, with the expectation that judges will rarely reify the 
political position with actual imposed liberty deprivations.  See Ewing v. California, 538 
U.S. 11, 43 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Sentencing statutes often shed little light 
upon real prison time. . . . [T]he statutory maximum is rarely the sentence imposed, 
and the sentence imposed is rarely the sentence that is served.” (citations omitted)). 
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Geography comes into play because of the many regional and 
state-level differences at work, which the static methodology of regis-
tration and recidivist laws replicates.  States, of course, vary considera-
bly with respect to the behaviors they deem worthy of criminal con-
demnation278 and the punishments they impose,279 with race playing a 
distinct and geographically varied role.280  Considerable variation also 
exists with procedural practices.  While courts disregard foreign con-
victions secured without affording defendants constitutional rights 
(for example, failing to obtain valid waivers for guilty pleas),281 they 
regularly tolerate a broad array of less rights-protective procedures 
that are not of constitutional magnitude.282  As a result, rather than 
remaining cabined in their respective states of origin, perhaps less 
than optimal procedural standards may be replicated across the land. 
E.  The Prospects for Amelioration 
Despite the foregoing concerns, it is unlikely that states will take 
ameliorative measures any time soon.  Such change is especially im-
probable as a result of the political process.  The political impotence 
of criminal offenders as a whole, amply demonstrated in the public 
choice literature,283 is apt to be particularly pronounced among immi-
278 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
279 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
280 See, e.g., Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan’s Law, 89 IOWA 
L. REV. 1535, 1538 (2004) (noting that African Americans are more than sixteen times 
as likely to be subject to registration and community notification than whites, and dis-
cussing significant variations among states).  For more on the racially disparate effect 
of sentencing more generally, see DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE:  RACE AND CLASS IN 
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); Symposium, The New Data:  Over-
Representation of Minorities in the Criminal Justice System, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 
(2003). 
281 See, e.g., People v. Bradley, 324 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (finding 
a defendant’s prior guilty pleas invalid and stating that “[w]hile we certainly cannot 
reverse the Indiana convictions, we will not permit the prior convictions to lengthen 
the defendant’s imprisonment for his present felony conviction [in Michigan]”); see 
also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972) (holding that the Sixth Amend-
ment prohibits the use of a prior conviction to enhance a sentence if the conviction 
was obtained in violation of the right to counsel). 
282 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 285 Cal. Rptr. 394, 399 (Ct. App. 1991) (counting a 
prior Nevada conviction toward sentence enhancement even though it was secured 
without the same procedural protections that California would afford). 
283 As Harold Krent has written, “[l]egislators need not fear that enacting most 
criminal measures will dry up campaign coffers.  Throughout history, criminal offend-
ers have been from the poorest strata in society . . . . Nor will legislators necessarily lose 
votes if they are insensitive to the needs of convicted felons.”  Harold J. Krent, The Puz-
zling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2168-
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grant ex-offenders, and sex offenders in particular,284 whose new-
comer status makes them even less capable of influencing political 
change.285
Nor are the courts likely to hold much promise for redress based 
on any potential constitutional challenges.  As for equal protection, 
the Supreme Court, consistent with its view that interstate disparities 
must only satisfy rational basis review,286 has twice upheld West Vir-
ginia’s recidivist law that allows enhanced sentences for those previ-
ously convicted of a crime punishable by “confinement in a peniten-
tiary.”287  As New York’s highest court concluded in rejecting an equal 
protection challenge (against its erstwhile external recidivist law): 
 [Such enhancements are] rationally related to the valid governmen-
tal aim of treating habitual offenders more severely than first time of-
fenders . . . . While persons guilty of acts which are felonies in other ju-
risdictions[,] but not in New York, are treated as second felony 
offenders, the statutory classification does not result in treatment so dis-
parate as to be arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory . . . . 
69 (1996); see also Logan, Democratic Despotism, supra note 276, at 468, 495 (surveying 
extensive public choice commentary addressing the political impotence of criminal 
offenders). 
284 See Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary 
Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 320-21 (2003) (discussing 
the widespread disdain felt for sex offenders and their attendant political powerless-
ness). 
285 Short of lobbying as such, voting itself is in question:  even those immigrant ex-
offenders who wish to vote might be barred as a result of their prior felony convictions.  
See Angela Behrens, Note, Voting—Not Quite a Fundamental Right?  A Look at Legal and 
Legislative Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231, 239 n.55 
(2004) (noting that fourteen states permanently bar persons convicted of felonies 
from voting); cf. Paul Tiao, Student Article, Non-Citizen Suffrage:  An Argument Based on 
the Voting Rights Act and Related Law, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 171, 171-72 (1993) 
(noting that legal permanent residents are not allowed to vote and thus are unable to 
voice their political opinions at the polls).  An interesting, and seemingly as yet unad-
dressed question, thus looms:  can a conviction in a foreign state serve to permanently 
disenfranchise an ex-felon who moves to a state with a more lenient view on suffrage, 
or, vice versa, a less lenient one?  Precedent exists for the proposition that one state 
need not honor another’s decision to restore the civil rights of a convicted felon, per-
mitting the felon to be prosecuted for illegal possession of a firearm.  See Farnsworth v. 
Commonwealth, 599 S.E.2d 482, 484 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (permitting the use of a prior 
West Virginia conviction as a predicate felony even though the defendant’s civil rights 
had been restored in West Virginia). 
286 See, e.g., Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 n.7 (1983) (applying a rational 
basis test to state citizenship criteria). 
287 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 449 (1962); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 
631 (1912).  Of note, West Virginia itself has since conceived of its recidivist enhance-
ment provision as being of an internal nature.  See supra note 54. 
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 The Legislature . . . exercised its considered judgment to provide that 
the seriousness of a crime should be determined by the severity of the 
sentence and the norms prevailing in the jurisdiction in which a crime 
was committed.  There is no warrant for any alarm in what may be 
termed as exaggerated fears of frivolous or perverse sister-State punish-
ment.  The possible disparity of treatment between prior New York of-
fenders vis-à-vis prior out-of-State offenders does not vitiate the legislative 
decision that an individual who has previously elected to violate the 
criminal standards of the society in which he was found should be 
treated as an habitual offender.
288
On the other hand, equal protection claims challenging the dif-
ferential use of registration, and more specifically community notifica-
tion, have of late shown some potential for success.  While courts have 
uniformly upheld state decisions to single out those convicted of sex 
offenses for registration and notification,289 and even to target solely 
those convicted of particular sex offenses,290 federal district courts—in 
Pennsylvania at least—have been troubled by the Commonwealth’s 
disparate treatment of in- versus out-of-state registrants.  In Doe v. 
McVey291 and Lines v. Wargo,292 the Eastern and Western Districts, re-
spectively, enjoined application of a Pennsylvania law that allowed in-
digenous sex offenders to contest their eligibility for community noti-
fication, and afforded them due process protections (including right 
to counsel and a hearing), yet withheld such rights from immigrant 
registrants and automatically subjected them to registration and noti-
fication.293
288 People v. Parker, 359 N.E.2d 348, 350-51 (N.Y. 1976); cf. Marshall v. United 
States, 414 U.S. 417, 430 (1974) (rejecting an equal protection challenge against a fed-
eral law denying rehabilitative treatment and imposing a prison term on persons twice 
convicted of felonies, as classified by the offense situs). 
289 See, e.g., Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1347 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding Flor-
ida’s decision to require sex offenders, but not other criminal offenders, to register). 
290 See, e.g., Jones v. Solis, 121 F. App’x 228, 229-30 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding 
California’s decision to require registration of those convicted of oral copulation with 
a minor but not those convicted of sexual intercourse with a minor). 
291 381 F. Supp. 2d 443, 451 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
292 271 F. Supp. 2d 649, 664 (W.D. Pa. 2003).  In an earlier decision, Doe v. Ward, 
124 F. Supp. 2d 900, 916 (W.D. Pa. 2000), the Western District held that Pennsylvania’s 
Interstate Compact Concerning Parole precluded the Commonwealth from placing 
“extraneous conditions” on out-of-state but not in-state registrants before subjecting 
them to community notification. 
293 Under Pennsylvania law at the time, only registrants deemed “sexually violent 
predators” were subject to community notification.  Under current law, effective Janu-
ary 2005, all registrants are subject to community notification via the Internet.  See 
McVey, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 446 n.4 (discussing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9798.1 
(2005)). 
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In McVey, the most recent decision, Judge Pollak rejected each of 
the Commonwealth’s proffered justifications for distinguishing resi-
dents on the basis of where a predicate offense occurred, concluding 
that the classification failed to satisfy rational basis review.294  First, 
Judge Pollak dismissed the asserted cost-savings involved, concluding 
that “[w]hile Pennsylvania might have a legitimate interest in saving 
money, it may not achieve this end by discriminating among similarly 
situated citizens.”295  Second, Judge Pollak rejected the Common-
wealth’s asserted goal of not “‘becom[ing] a haven for sex offenders, 
even though they are not sexually violent predators, by encouraging 
them to seek the anonymity that they lost in the state where they were 
convicted.’”296  To Pollak, the desire to not become a “haven” was 
“unlikely” to be a constitutionally permissible goal,297 and at any rate 
did not justify withholding due process rights from similarly situated 
out-of-state registrants.298
Finally, Judge Pollak gave short shrift to the Commonwealth’s ar-
gument that the classification was justified because Pennsylvania’s 
residents are less likely to be aware of the offense/offender “‘in the 
daily public discourse or through the media than would be the case 
for an in-state offender.’”299 Invoking the Western District’s analysis in 
Lines, Judge Pollak reasoned that this same knowledge deficit was at 
play with respect to in-state registrants, and indeed motivated and jus-
tified registration and notification laws more generally.300  As a result, 
to Pollak “any concern over the public’s lack of knowledge about out-
of-state offenders applies with equal force to in-state offenders and, 
therefore, cannot justify Pennsylvania’s disparate treatment of the two 
groups.”301
The outcomes in McVey and Lines, while surely cause for optimism 
among the defense bar, should be greeted with some reserve, how-
ever, insofar as the constitutionality of external variety laws in general 
is concerned.  This is so for several reasons.  First, the claims in each 
case concerned community notification which, unlike registration 
alone, has traditionally inspired greater judicial concern due to its 
294 Id. at 451. 
295 Id. at 450. 
296 Id. (quoting Brief for Defendant at 24) 
297 Id. at 450 n.8. 
298 Id. at 450. 
299 Id. (quoting Brief for Defendant at 24). 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 451. 
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more burdensome effects.302  Second, Pennsylvania law, as of January 
2005, did away with the two-track notification scheme for in- and out-
of-state offenders (the only such regime in the nation), mooting the 
analytic rubric.303  In sum, courts, as they have been inclined to do 
with registration-related claims more generally, will very likely be in-
clined to find, as they have with recidivists, that any in- versus out-of-
state classification itself is not cause for equal protection concern.304
Assuming that classification itself fails to pose a problem, an equal 
protection concern might arise because a fundamental right is differ-
entially infringed by registration.  Conceivably, the privacy intrusions 
attending registration (and especially notification) might be thought 
to jeopardize the right to privacy.  Courts, however, have rejected such 
challenges.305  The differential impact on the right to travel also might 
serve as a basis for challenge.  However, again, courts have not been 
amenable to such claims.306
A claim sounding in privileges and immunities, based on the ar-
gument that the forum treats incoming ex-offenders differently than it 
treats its indigenous population, might hold greater promise.  In Saenz 
302 See, e.g., In re Risk Level Determination of C.M., 578 N.W.2d 391, 399 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1998) (precluding notification, but not registration, when an individual is 
charged with, but not convicted of, a statutorily enumerated offense requiring registra-
tion). 
303 Act of Nov. 24, 2004, 2005 Pa. Laws 152, secs. 7-8 (amending 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 9792, 9795.1–.2 (2002)). 
304 Despite the pessimistic view expressed in the text, a recent decision from the 
Ninth Circuit suggests that California law might present an equal protection difficulty.  
In Beene v. Terhune, the court noted that California requires out-of-state juvenile of-
fenders to register regardless of when they committed their offense, but requires in-
state juvenile offenders to register only if they committed their offense after 1986.  380 
F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2004). The State conceded that if the provision applied, the 
case “might present an ‘equal protection problem.’”  Id.  Because the Arkansas records 
were unclear on whether Beene was adjudicated as a juvenile, however, the issue was 
not squarely addressed by the panel.  Id. at 1153. 
305 See, e.g., Hendrix v. Taylor, 579 S.E.2d 320, 324 (S.C. 2003) (“[P]rivacy protec-
tions do not extend to information about a sexual offense Appellant committed in an-
other state, which became a matter of public record when Appellant registered as a sex 
offender in [the foreign state].”).  South Carolina’s external approach registration law 
satisfied rational basis review in Hendrix because “the purpose of the law is to protect 
the public welfare and to assist law enforcement in accomplishing that goal.”  Id.  De-
ferring to a foreign state’s registration decision was a “reasonable method” of achieving 
public protection.  Id. 
306 See, e.g., State v. Wigglesworth, 63 P.3d 1185, 1190 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (con-
cluding that registration does not impinge the constitutional right to free travel); Ex 
Parte Robinson, 80 S.W.3d 709, 716 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that registration, rather 
than denying appellant his fundamental right to travel, at most “demonstrated an indi-
rect burden on his right to travel”), aff’d, 116 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 
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v. Roe, the Court invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause to invalidate a law that, akin to the external variety 
of laws examined here, permitted newcomers to receive welfare bene-
fits only to the extent permissible under the law of their former state 
of residence.307  Observing that the Clause removes “the disabilities of 
alienage” from state citizens entering other states in the Union and 
affords them “equality of privilege with citizens of [the host] States,”308 
the majority concluded: 
The “right to travel” discussed in our cases embraces at least three dif-
ferent components.  It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter 
and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor 
rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second 
State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, 
the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.
309
By extension, the differential treatment of offenders might raise 
constitutional concern.  Unlike Saenz, however, which involved the 
disparate distribution of subsistence benefits, subjecting individuals to 
unequal registration and recidivist sentence enhancements would not 
likely implicate a constitutionally protected interest.310  Moreover, 
while in effect external laws might discourage interstate migration, the 
laws, unlike the two-track welfare benefits invalidated in Saenz, are not 
expressly enacted with this intent, which was of particular concern to 
the Court.311  And even if the courts were to be persuaded otherwise, a 
forum state could still likely defend its action by showing that valid 
“reasons do exist and [that] the degree of discrimination bears a close 
relation to them.”312  This is especially so given the significant judicial 
deference afforded state criminal justice policies, even those harshly 
out of kilter compared to the nation as a whole.313
307 526 U.S. 489, 504-07 (1999). 
308 Id. at 502. 
309 Id. at 500. 
310 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.38, at 
1066-67 (7th ed. 2004) (noting that to be actionable, a law must “constitute[] a sub-
stantial impairment” of a fundamental right and serve as “a significant deterren[t] to 
persons migrating into a state”); see also id. at 1065 (noting that the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of Article IV prohibits “restricting certain basic rights, such as the abil-
ity to engage in private sector commercial activity or the ability to exercise a constitu-
tionally protected liberty”). 
311 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506 (acknowledging that “such a purpose would be 
unequivocally impermissible”). 
312 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948). 
313 The Court’s decision in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), is a case in 
point.  In Ewing, a 5-4 majority upheld against an Eighth Amendment attack Califor-
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Finally, any procedure-based challenge would also likely fail.  Re-
cidivist enhancements have long been impregnable to due process 
challenges, on the reasoning that prior convictions (wherever they oc-
cur) are “circumstances” individuals have already had a procedurally 
safeguarded chance to contest.314  Likewise, while room now exists to 
challenge consideration of the extra-judicial record in enhancement 
eligibility decisions, and perhaps even to challenge the “prior convic-
tion exception” as a whole, pursuant to the Court’s recent decision in 
Shepard, thereby requiring that juries play a greater role in eligibility 
determinations,T315 the constitutional integrity of interconnection it-
self would remain intact. 
The prospects for mounting a procedure-based challenge to regis-
tration are only somewhat less bleak.  In Connecticut Department of Pub-
lic Safety v. Doe, the Supreme Court concluded that states need not af-
ford individuals any procedural rights and protections before 
mandating registration and community notification.316  In so doing, 
the Court attached particular importance to the fact that the chal-
lenged Connecticut law was triggered solely on the basis of a convic-
tion for a statutorily enumerated offense, not any finding or inference 
that an individual was “currently dangerous.”317  Because the law was 
applied automatically, and did not hinge on proof of a particular fact 
(i.e., “dangerousness”), the Court did not address whether a protect-
ible liberty interest was implicated, warranting due process.318  How-
ever, the vast majority of federal courts addressing the question have 
concluded that registration and community notification do not 
nia’s three strikes law, the harshest in the nation, noting the Court’s “tradition of de-
ferring to state legislatures in making and implementing such important policy deci-
sions.”  Id. at 24.  While agreeing that the law had “sparked controversy,” the majority 
also observed with seeming approval its “unintended but positive consequence” of en-
couraging parolees to leave the state.  Id. at 27 (citation omitted); see also Spencer v. 
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 566 (1967) (“Tolerance for a spectrum of state procedures . . . is 
especially appropriate here.  The rate of recidivism is acknowledged to be high, a wide 
variety of methods dealing with the problem exists, and experimentation is in pro-
gress.”). 
314 See, e.g., Goodman v. Kunkle, 72 F.2d 334, 336 (7th Cir. 1934) (noting that re-
cidivist statutes “do not create or define a new or independent crime, but they pre-
scribe circumstances wherein one found guilty of a specific crime may be more se-
verely penalized because of his previous criminalities as they are alleged and found”). 
315 See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text. 
316 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003). 
317 Id. at 7. 
318 Id. 
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threaten a liberty interest.319  As a result, any procedural claim would 
likely be doomed as a threshold matter for want of a protectible lib-
erty interest,320 mooting any argument that internal approach laws 
(unlike the Connecticut statute in Doe) condition registration eligibil-
ity on something more than merely whether a prior conviction for an 
enumerated offense exists.321
III.  THE FEDERALISM IMPLICATIONS OF INTERCONNECTION 
As the preceding discussion makes clear, interconnection has ma-
jor implications for states and individuals alike.  By its very nature, 
however, interconnection also unavoidably implicates federalism, its 
319 See, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 478 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
registration and community notification do not threaten a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Since we 
have already rejected their privacy claims, we conclude that [the defendants] have no 
liberty interest at stake, and hence we reject their due process claims.”). 
320 Conceivably, reviewing courts might attach significance to the fact that foreign 
convictions, unlike indigenous ones on record in the forum, are less likely to be within 
the ken of forum residents, thus lessening the likelihood of stigma.  See, e.g., Russell, 
124 F.3d at 1094 (deeming it important that conviction and offender residence infor-
mation are otherwise publicly available in the jurisdiction); Femedeer v. Haun, 35 F. 
Supp. 2d 852, 861 (D. Utah 1999) (concluding that conviction and address informa-
tion are not protected because of their public availability); Doe v. Kelly, 961 F. Supp. 
1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (explaining that the Michigan statute “does nothing 
more than compile truthful, public information and make it available”).  However, 
such an outcome seems unlikely given the judicial predisposition to indulge the fantasy 
that forum residents would take it upon themselves to assemble the otherwise diffused 
information collectively purveyed by notification.  Furthermore, with the increasing 
availability of state conviction records on the Internet, any such argument is addition-
ally weakened.  See Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law:  An Economic Perspective on 
Megan’s Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 380-81 (2005) (noting that approximately 
forty states and the District of Columbia currently operate sex offender registry web-
sites); see also supra note 23 (noting National Sex Offender Public Registry, which 
promises to “provide one-step access to registries” nationwide). 
321 In Creekmore v. Attorney General, 341 F. Supp. 2d 648, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2004), the 
court adopted the highly unusual position that the burdens associated with registra-
tion, alone, implicated a liberty interest and distinguished the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Doe.  According to the court, unlike the Connecticut law at issue in Doe, Texas 
law required that an out-of-state prior offense resulting in conviction be “substantially 
similar” to a statutorily prescribed offense warranting registration in Texas.  Id.  While 
prior Texas convictions for any such prescribed offenses might properly trigger auto-
matic registration, the comparative law analysis required for out-of-state registrants in-
volved a “contested fact” that was legally material to the Texas registration require-
ment, compelling that due process be afforded.  Id. at 665-66.  Ultimately, however, the 
court rebuffed Creekmore’s facial challenge to the law, concluding that the Texas re-
gime, see supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text, contained sufficient due process 
protections, but that they were not extended in Creekmore’s case.  Creekmore, 341 F. 
Supp. 2d at 667. 
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horizontal genus in particular.  The decisions by states to use the 
criminal justice outcomes of their fellow states, and their decisions on 
which evaluative approach to adopt (external or internal), shed im-
portant light on the functional and theoretical effects of horizontal 
federalism. 
A.  The Internal Approach 
In a fundamental sense, internal approach states can be consid-
ered stalwarts of “fifty-labs” federalism.  By insisting that foreign con-
victions warrant recidivist or registration treatment under their own 
laws, and not deferring to the judgments of the states where the con-
victions occurred, the states reify federalist values of self-governance 
and autonomy.  While perhaps representing a slap in the face in terms 
of comity, the absence of deference underscores such states’ resolve to 
honor their own criminal law standards and the normative positions 
they represent.  As recently noted by the Georgia Supreme Court: 
A state cannot express its public policy more strongly than through its 
penal code.  When a state defines conduct as criminal and sets the pun-
ishment for the offender, it is conveying in the clearest possible terms its 
view of public policy.  Full faith and credit ordinarily should not require 
a state to abandon such fundamental policy in favor of the public policy 
of another jurisdiction.
322
By sticking to their sovereign guns, and adhering to recidivist and 
registrant eligibility criteria prescribed by their own legislatures, in-
ternal jurisdictions also serve the experimentalist values of federalism 
in a more indirect way.  To the extent that interconnection functions 
to promote inter-governmental dialogue,323 if policy makers in the for-
eign state are listening,324 and they desire continued accountability of 
322 State v. Langlands, 583 S.E.2d 18, 20 n.4 (Ga. 2003); see also State v. Clough, 
829 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (“The obvious purpose of [the state’s inter-
nal approach recidivist law] is to preclude the enhancement of a sentence if the con-
duct which led to a conviction in another state has not been judged by our legislature 
to be so egregious . . . as to justify treating it as a felony.”). 
323 The prospect was advanced most visibly by Justice Brennan with regard to verti-
cal federalism.  See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States:  The Revival of 
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986) 
(“[T]he Court’s contraction of federal rights and remedies on grounds of federalism 
should be interpreted as a plain invitation to state courts to step into the breach.”). 
324 The experimentalist tradition in criminal justice is an ongoing, vibrant one, 
with countless innovative methods having originated in individual states only to be 
copied by fellow states (and even the federal government).  See Susan R. Klein, Inde-
pendent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541, 1557 (2002) (noting state 
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and social control over their migrating offenders,325 rejection by the 
internal state of the prior conviction might serve to hasten legal evolu-
tion there.  This can entail changes to substantive law, such as clarify-
ing aspects of statutory language,326 or procedures, such as when the 
foreign state provides less in the way of access to counsel or jury trial 
rights than the forum.327
Whether such change itself is salutary, of course, is in the eye of 
the beholder.  For instance, offenders convicted of carrying a con-
cealed weapon in the North, where such an offense commonly is pun-
ished harshly, can often travel south (where firearms are more loosely 
regulated) free of worry that their felony record will pose a risk of re-
cidivist enhancement.328  Similarly, a conviction for possessing illegal 
drugs might warrant felony status in one state that takes an especially 
negative view of drug use, yet might be sanctioned mildly in another 
with a more lenient view.329  Under both circumstances, the forum’s 
critical approach might encourage the foreign states to reconsider 
their harsh stance.  On the other hand, the forum state’s refusal to 
consider a foreign conviction because the offense did not warrant fel-
ony status there might prompt the foreign state to punish the offense 
more harshly.330
innovations including “boot camps, drug courts, and shaming devices”); Reitz, supra 
note 15, at 128 (noting that major penological movements have emanated from the 
state and local level, including modern sentencing guidelines and sentencing commis-
sion initiatives). 
325 As discussed later, there is some reason to doubt, however, that foreign juris-
dictions have much incentive to care how another jurisdiction later handles an erst-
while resident ex-offender.  See infra note 386 and accompanying text. 
326 See, e.g., Timothy v. State, 90 P.3d 177, 180 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting a 
prior foreign burglary conviction due to statutory ambiguity). 
327 See, e.g., State v. Sinagoga, 918 P.2d 228, 238 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to 
consider a prior foreign uncounseled conviction). 
328 See, e.g., Poole v. State, 445 So. 2d 967, 973 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (rejecting a 
Michigan felony conviction for carrying concealed weapon because the offense was not 
deemed a felony in Alabama). 
329 See supra note 13 (noting the varied positions of North Dakota and Minnesota 
on marijuana possession); cf. Commonwealth v. Shaw, 744 A.2d 739, 744 (Pa. 2000) 
(rejecting a New York DUI conviction because the offense was triggered by “an appre-
ciably lesser degree of impairment”). 
330 See, e.g., State v. Decker, 833 P.2d 704, 706 (Ariz. 1992) (rejecting a prior Iowa 
conviction because it was classified as an aggravated misdemeanor there, despite being 
classified as a felony in Arizona). 
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B.  The External Approach 
The federalism implications of the external approach are at once 
more ambiguous and potentially more profound.  In one sense, by de-
ferring to outcomes in other states, the external approach honors 
state diversity and gives it effect.  The approach embodies the notion 
that “[g]ood citizenship requires obedience and observance to the 
laws of sister states as much as those of this state.”331  Much as the U.S. 
Constitution’s Extradition Clause requires a state to surrender to an-
other state an individual who has violated that state’s criminal law, re-
gardless of whether the behavior violates the law of the surrendering 
state,332 the external approach places premium importance on com-
ity.333  Compared to the internal approach, which permits itinerant ex-
offenders to slip through the cracks as a result of its interpretive proc-
ess,334 the external approach also better ensures continued account-
ability of offenders and hence serves more aggressive social control in-
terests.  It does so by tying registration and recidivist enhancement 
decisions to not just its own criteria, but those of other states as well. 
Yet by the same token, there is no mistaking that the external ap-
proach, in achieving these goals, entails a disavowal of state autonomy.  
The ramifications of this for horizontal federalism are several-fold. 
1.  Democratic Representativeness 
First and perhaps foremost, the external approach undercuts the 
democratic representativeness of the criminal law.  By bootstrapping 
331 State v. Prince, 132 P.2d 146, 149 (Idaho 1942). 
332 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see also Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 226 
(1987) (“[T]he Extradition Clause creates a mandatory duty to deliver up fugitives 
upon proper demand . . . .”). 
333 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 493 (2003) (stating that comity is 
“an accommodation policy, under which the courts of one state voluntarily give effect 
to the laws and judicial decisions of another state out of deference and respect, to 
promote harmonious interstate relations”). 
334 For criticism to this effect, see Galt, supra note 24, at 1135-39 (discussing the 
capacity of New York law to permit migrating offenders to escape recidivist account-
ability).  Alaska law, however, provides an interesting example of governmental re-
sponsiveness in this regard.  In Scroggins v. State, 951 P.2d 442, 444 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1998), the court refused to find that the defendant’s prior California conviction for 
lewd and lascivious acts upon a child was “similar” to any Alaska felony, and therefore 
refused to enhance his sentence.  The legislature thereafter amended its recidivist law 
to specifically allow for this precise crime to be deemed a prior felony.  See ALASKA 
STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(4)(B) (2004) (“[A] felony conviction in another jurisdiction 
making it a crime to commit any lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 
sixteen years . . . is a prior conviction for a sexual felony . . . .”). 
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value judgments of their fellow sovereigns, external approach states 
flout the premise that state criminal laws reciprocally reflect335 and 
shape336 the normative views of the jurisdiction that enacts them.  As 
Dan Kahan has observed, the criminal law is “suffused with meaning.  
What it punishes (drug possession, sodomy) can tell us what kind of 
life the community views as virtuous; how it punishes (imprisonment, 
corporal punishment, fines) can tell us what forms of affliction it views 
as appropriate to mark wrongdoers’ disgrace . . . .”337  While some 
have argued that the decentralizing effect of federalism in itself fails 
to ensure politically representative, localized governance,338 the exter-
nal approach renounces outright any such prospect, and with it what 
the Anti-Federalists lauded as state “individuality.”339  Much as a ven-
triloquist uses a dummy, states employing the external approach 
mimic the value judgments of other states,340 with the revered “fifty 
335 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (observing that the “clearest and 
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by 
the country’s legislatures” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989))); 
Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1017 (1940) (“It is 
one of the functions of the criminal law to give expression to the collective feeling of 
revulsion toward certain acts, even when they are not very dangerous . . . .”). 
336 See Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:  Overcriminali-
zation and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1555-56 (1997) 
(“[J]ust as the decision to make certain conduct criminal reflects publicly-held moral 
norms, so too are public perceptions of morality affected by what has been made 
criminal.  The relationship that public morality and the criminal law bear to each 
other is thus a reciprocal one.”); see also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility 
of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-77 (1997) (providing an overview of the law’s in-
fluence on the creation of social norms). 
337 Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 
362 (1997); see also id. at 365 (referring to the “criminal law as a political institution”); 
Dorothea Kübler, On the Regulation of Social Norms, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449, 451 
(2001) (defining a norm as “a moral expectation shared by a group of people, entail-
ing social stigmatization or at least moral indignation aimed at those who deviate”). 
338 See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM:  A DIALOGUE 93 (1995) (contending 
that some states are too large and diverse to reflect local concerns); cf. KENNETH J. 
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-60 (2d ed. 1963) (discussing theo-
retical barriers to incorporating individual concerns into collective preferences). 
339 See SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A NATION:  THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 239 (1993) (quoting Dr. Johnson of Connecticut who observed that the 
Anti-Federalists saw “the states as ‘so many political societies,’ each with its ‘individual-
ity,’ while the [Federalists] considered the states as merely ‘districts of people compos-
ing one political Society’”).  On this point more generally, see Timothy Zick, Statehood 
as the New Personhood:  The Discovery of Fundamental “States’ Rights,” 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 213, 226-43 (2004). 
340 The concept is borrowed from Justice Scalia who, in an anti-commandeering 
case invalidating congressional efforts to require states to implement the federal hand-
gun control legislation, condemned Congress’s having “dragooned” state officials and 
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labs” model of horizontal federalism, and the dynamism and diversity 
it hopefully entails, consequently diminished.341
In turn, by creating a legal landscape in which it becomes difficult 
to ascribe value judgments with geo-political accuracy, the external 
approach also functions to undermine governmental transparency 
and political accountability.342  By deferring to the laws of other sover-
eigns, forum state officials become free riders:  they avoid any possible 
negative political consequences that might attend enforcement of 
such laws in the first instance in the forum.343  For instance, a state 
with an external approach registration law can effectively codify 
“peeping” (South Carolina) or adultery (Kansas) as convictions re-
quiring registration, if it is otherwise politically wary of adopting the 
requirements via the formal legislative process.344  The external ap-
reduced states to “puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.” Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (citations omitted). 
341 The internal approach raises political representativeness concerns as well, al-
though not nearly so distinct.  State legislatures adopting internal laws (especially with 
broad language) in effect cede their lawmaking authority to executive branch actors 
(prosecutors), who have discretion whether to invoke such laws and tender legal ar-
guments in support.  See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 (2001) (“As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudi-
cation pass into the hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, de-
termine who goes to prison and for how long.”).  Another measure is ceded to the ju-
diciary, which must interpret state laws and ascribe meaning to their broad terms.  Cf. 
Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 5, 
6-11 (1997) (asserting that by enacting broad statutes, Congress effectively cedes power 
to define the scope of criminal laws to the judiciary). 
342 Just such a concern inspired the Supreme Court, in New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992), to invalidate Congress’s attempt to commandeer New 
York to dispose of low-level radioactive waste within its borders.  Writing for the Court, 
Justice O’Connor noted: 
Where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state 
officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal offi-
cials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the elec-
toral ramifications of their decision.  Accountability is thus diminished 
when . . . elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of 
the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation. 
Id. at 169; see also id. at 183 (noting that when governments combine their efforts to 
disguise responsibility, “federalism is hardly being advanced”). 
343 However, the legerdemain ultimately carries undisputed (non-political) costs:  
the financial expenditures associated with imposing registration requirements (possi-
bly along with community notification) and enhancing prison terms, borne by the fo-
rum state alone.  Moreover, defendants faced with enhancement might be less likely to 
plead guilty and decide to pursue trials in the forum instead, which would entail addi-
tional associated costs. 
344 This also serves to provide political cover for judges and prosecutors, especially 
when they must stand for popular election. 
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proach thus permits jurisdictions to indulge in a kind of stealth legis-
lation:  laws are applied by the forum without having been subject to 
the debate and compromise common to the legislative process,345 de-
priving the public of an important occasion for norm identification 
and support.346  While it might be the case that the imported value 
judgment parallels that of the forum, this is not necessarily so, and the 
stealth quality of the approach undercuts the consensus-based (or at 
least majority-approved) value choices a formal law embodies.347
Importantly, this outcome does not derive from any strong-arm 
political measure by another sovereign, such as occurs in instances of 
federal commandeering.348  Nor does it stem from a “[d]enial of 
[states’] right to experiment,” the concern animating Justice Brandeis 
in New State Ice,349 as occurs with federal usurpation of state criminal 
law prerogatives under vertical federalism;350 nor from any constitu-
tional compulsion, such as the Full Faith and Credit Clause, requiring 
345 The situation presents an interesting contrast with the phenomenon of codi-
fied criminal laws that go unenforced.  See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals:  
The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000) 
(discussing the social harms caused by unenforced sodomy laws and the legitimacy 
they lend to prejudice).  Here, rather than being formally enacted yet not enforced, 
the laws are enforced yet not formally enacted. 
346 As Paul Robinson has noted, the legislative process provides “an occasion for 
public debate that can help build norms, with the conclusion of the debate announced 
by legislative action, or inaction.”  Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care 
What the Layperson Thinks Is Just?  Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1839, 1867 (2000); see also id. at 1868-69 (“The criminal law is . . . a contributing 
mechanism by which the norm-nurturing process moves forward . . . . Our criminal law 
is, for us, the place we express our shared beliefs of what is truly condemnable.”). 
347 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
401, 405 (1958) (describing criminal laws as embodying the “formal and solemn pro-
nouncement of the moral condemnation of the community”).  Use of the term “for-
mal” here is in no way intended to mean legal formalism.  As Elizabeth Anderson and 
Richard Pildes have pointed out: 
Appropriate concern with form in law should not be equated with legal formal-
ism.  Legal formalism entails applying legal rules, categories, concepts, and 
forms without regard to the underlying purposes or values those rules ought 
to serve.  Expressive constraints, by contrast, pay attention to these underlying 
purposes and values.  Nothing in expressivist concern for form requires that 
such a concern be applied in a wooden, mechanical way. 
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:  A General Restate-
ment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1564 n.184 (2000). 
348 See supra note 342. 
349 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
350 See supra note 27. 
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one state to recognize another’s penal judgment, as none exists.351  
Rather, the disempowerment is self-willed and self-imposed.352  De-
spite states’ unquestioned sovereignty in the criminal law realm, which 
is so powerful that it permits multiple states to successively prosecute 
and convict the same individual for identical criminal misbehavior,353 
the states self-consciously defer to the laws and judgments of their fel-
low governments. 
In so doing, external approach states forsake what Professors 
Baker and Young have called the “negative freedom” of federalism—
the right to act autonomously and independently, free of the con-
straining authority of other governmental units.354  Over eighty years 
ago, some ten years before Justice Brandeis’ language in New State Ice, 
Justice Holmes extolled the capacity of federalism to foster “social ex-
periments . . . in the insulated chambers afforded by the several 
states.”355  The external approach ignores this invitation and thus gain-
says a central animating value of horizontal federalism.356
351 See Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970) (“[T]he Full Faith and Credit 
Clause does not require that sister States enforce a foreign penal judgment . . . .” (cita-
tions omitted)); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294 n.6 (1942) (“It has been 
repeatedly stated that the full faith and credit clause does not require one state to en-
force the penal laws of another.”). 
352 See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) (noting that state criminal 
laws “can have extraterritorial effect only by the comity of other States”); Clark v. 
Gladden, 432 P.2d 182, 185 (Or. 1967) (“No state is required to take notice of foreign 
convictions in sentencing those who violate its own criminal laws.  Each state is free to 
give foreign convictions such force as it deems proper in the administration of local 
sentencing policy.”). 
353 See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (upholding the right of Alabama 
to prosecute a defendant and seek the death penalty when Georgia had already im-
posed a life term on the defendant for the same killing on the basis of the “dual sover-
eignty doctrine”); see also id. at 93 (“A State’s interest in vindicating its sovereign au-
thority through enforcement of its laws by definition can never be satisfied by another 
State’s enforcement of its own laws.”). 
354 Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial 
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 134 (2001).  As Professor Young alone recently observed, “state 
governments cannot provide fora for political participation and competition unless 
meaningful decisions are being made in those fora.”  Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist 
Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 52 (2004). 
355 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also 
Deborah J. Merritt, Federalism as Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 541, 541-42 (1995) (sur-
veying the various ways in which federalism empowers states to experiment with solu-
tions to social problems). 
356 Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few:  New Principles to Define the Proper Lim-
its for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 993-94 (1995) (“A decentral-
ized federal system . . . permits criminal justice policy to be tailored to local conditions 
and policy preferences; and it furthers political accountability.”); cf. Kevin N. Wright, 
The Desirability of Goal Conflict Within the Criminal Justice System, 9 J. CRIM. JUST. 209, 214-
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2.  Pluralism and Competition 
In a related sense, the external approach impairs the pluralism 
and competition ideally fostered by autonomous state rule.  With its 
predominant emphasis on comity, the approach ultimately constricts 
the range of normative choices available to individuals, diminishing 
what Alexander Hamilton called the competition “for the people’s ‘af-
fection.’”357  This competition, Hamilton reasoned, has particular 
resonance with respect to the administration of justice, “the most 
powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular . . . at-
tachment” because it is “the immediate and visible guardian of life 
and property.”358
If prior convictions constitute indelible matters of record, trans-
geographically affecting recidivism and registration decisions, as is the 
case with the external approach, geography is permitted to determine 
destiny359—and individuals with such records will naturally be less in-
clined to move.360  This, one might infer, is the precise objective of leg-
islators in such states—to discourage ex-offenders from moving into 
their states.  Nonetheless, by in effect making laws more uniform, the 
15 (1981) (endorsing diversity because it permits inevitable conflicts in community 
values to be fleshed out and resolved). 
357 Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection:  Federalism’s Forgotten Market-
place, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 332 (2003) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 120 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
358 THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, supra note 357, at 120. 
359 See Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1510, 1512-13 
(1984) (observing generally that “geography is fate . . . not only for a country, but also 
for its culture and its law”). 
360 This presumes, of course, that ex-offenders are aware of the registration 
and/or recidivist provisions of the state to which they might move.  Charles Tiebout 
advanced the tenet that decentralized governance enables citizens to “vote with their 
feet” by moving to jurisdictions with laws that most benefit them.  See Tiebout, supra 
note 3, at 418 (“The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which 
best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods.”).  Tiebout himself acknowl-
edged that his analytic model presumed adequate legal knowledge of such compara-
tive differences, which of course does not always reflect reality.  See id. at 419 (“Con-
sumer-voters are assumed to have full knowledge of differences among revenue and 
expenditure patterns and to react to those differences.”).  While ex-offenders arguably 
have greater incentives to conduct comparative legal analysis, given that their liberty is 
at stake, there is little reason to think that they would be any better informed, and thus 
equipped to choose, in this regard.  Indeed, such competence is even less likely given 
the lower social and educational status of many ex-offenders.  Cf. Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism:  Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 420-21 (1990) 
(suggesting that interjurisdictional mobility is constrained by “economic and social fac-
tors that tend to affect poorer people more than affluent ones” and that “investors of 
capital and owners of businesses, rather than residents, are the prime beneficiaries of” 
relocation options). 
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external approach discourages exit rights,361 and limits freedom of 
movement, an accepted constitutional good.362  In a more instrumen-
tal sense, the approach can hinder the free transfer of human and so-
cial capital by, for instance, discouraging persons convicted of sodomy 
or peeping from migrating.  Consequently, the prospective state resi-
dence may be deprived of such persons’ talents and resources.  As a 
result, overdeterrence can occur with consequent social inefficiencies 
being created.363
In short, ex-offenders atavistically become tribe-like members of 
the state in which their conviction occurred,364 ineradicably marked by 
the values and criminal law norms of their erstwhile residences, con-
trary to the free movement ideals of the nation’s federal republic.365
3.  Race-to-the-Bottom Consequences 
Finally, the external approach can ultimately have race-to-the-
bottom consequences.  While the concept is most familiar to eco-
nomic and environmental concerns,366 a similar scenario is susceptible 
361 See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State 
Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 140 (1996) (“[U]niform state laws tend to decrease exit 
opportunities.”). 
362 See supra note 177 and accompanying text; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 178-79 (1980) (asserting that the right 
to travel is important because it protects an individual’s capacity to leave an “oppres-
sive” community “and relocat[e] in a community whose values he or she finds more 
compatible”). 
363 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (discussing the phenomenon of overdeterrence). 
364 As Seth Kreimer has noted, state-based identification is a relic of antebellum 
thought and behavior: 
At the time of the Civil War, Robert E. Lee resigned his federal commission, 
and renounced his oath of allegiance because as a “Virginian” he could not 
bear to honor that oath.  It is hard today to find a citizen of the United States 
who conceives of her primary identity as a “Virginian” or a “Pennsylva-
nian” . . . . 
Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand:  The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 973, 984 (2003). 
365 As Douglas Laycock has observed, “[t]here are other ways to organize, but we 
did not choose them.  An American state is not like a nomadic tribe, with membership 
based on kinship . . . . The state . . . is defined by its territory, and ‘its people’ are de-
fined by the territory in which they live.”  Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and 
Territorial States:  The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 
316-17 (1992); see also Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 609 (1860) (“The position that 
a citizen carries with him, into every state which he may go, the legal institutions of the 
one in which he was born, cannot be supported.”). 
366 See, e.g., PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 121-24 (1995) (discuss-
ing the phenomenon in the context of state welfare laws); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabili-
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of occurring in the criminal justice realm.367  This is because criminal 
justice matters are subject to uniquely potent political pressures.368  No 
politician relishes the prospect of being cast as a coddler of crimi-
nals,369 especially sex offenders.370
In such a climate, the external approach, whereby the harshly 
idiosyncratic views of a state are exported to other states, can have par-
ticular resonance.371  For instance, before the Supreme Court invali-
dated state laws criminalizing consensual homosexual sodomy in Law-
rence v. Texas,372 the external approach would compel recognition of 
tating Interstate Competition:  Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Envi-
ronmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1213-19 (1992) (discussing the phenome-
non in the context of environmental regulations). 
367 The “bottom” relative to criminal justice of course differs from that in the 
realm of commercial and environmental regulation.  With the latter, states wishing to 
attract business are tempted to adopt laxer laws than they otherwise might.  While 
states might logically be said to be fearful of being perceived as “anti-business,” no such 
apprehension exists over being seen as “anti-criminal.”  As a result, undue laxness is 
the risk in the commercial realm, whereas undue harshness is the risk with criminal 
justice matters as states (and their politicians) endeavor to avoid being perceived as 
“soft” on crime. 
368 As William Stuntz has observed, “[i]f there is any sphere in which politicians 
have an incentive simply to please the majority of voters it’s criminal law.”  Stuntz, su-
pra note 341, at 529-30. 
369 For extended discussions of this effect, see DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE 
POLITICS OF HYSTERIA (1995); KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY:  LAW AND 
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1997). 
370 See Janus & Logan, supra note 284, at 320-21 (noting the wave of harsh laws tar-
geting sex offenders enacted in the 1990s, including registration and community noti-
fication provisions, which were rapidly approved in the wake of high-profile sexual vic-
timizations). 
371 Importantly, by definition the external approach operates only in one direc-
tion:  to systematically import laws of a harsher nature, despite the forum state’s more 
permissive law (i.e., failing to expressly consider the behavior for registration or recidi-
vist purposes).  In this vein, Susan Klein has observed a kindred phenomenon in the 
realm of vertical federalism whereby Congress criminalizes conduct not the subject of 
state criminalization, or otherwise impedes state laws permitting behavior made crimi-
nal by the federal government, for instance with respect to medical marijuana or phy-
sician-assisted suicide.  Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1541, 1565-79 (2002).  In such cases, federal laws intrude upon “state-
created liberty interests.”  Id. at 1544.  Professor Klein reasons that “[w]hen only a few 
states are outliers, they will probably not succeed, via the national political process, in 
protecting their citizens from the majority’s will.”  Id.  “When the state’s norm is inde-
pendent of the federal norm, the outlier state will rarely obtain the allies necessary to 
win protection from contrary federal legislation in the political process.”  Id. at 1560.  
Here, by analogy, by forsaking its prerogative to not count the foreign conviction, the 
state is eschewing its own independently created norm. 
372 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). 
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such convictions for purposes of registration.373  Despite their laggard 
status, the states would in effect “rule the nation.”374  This reflexive 
recognition, in addition to replicating the initial injustice, could ulti-
mately foster a familiarity and comfort in the forum states with the 
foreign value judgment, bringing political pressure to formally recog-
nize the laggard position via the legislative process.  Similarly, states 
with laggard procedural rights and those with draconian sentences for 
drug offenses, for instance, could well catch the notice of more pro-
gressive states, fueling a downward spiral of harshness. 
Such choices, of course, are part and parcel of the decentralized, 
autonomous quality of federalism itself.  As Lynn Baker has observed, 
“[t]he freedom of sub-national political communities to choose their 
own visions of the good society, like any other form of ‘diversity,’ pre-
dictably results in a mixed bag of results.”375  Yet there is no mistaking 
that the policy of states adopting the external approach represents a 
disavowal of this local prerogative, which, as a consequence, permits 
the “mixed” (typically crime control oriented) decisions of certain 
states to have effect far beyond their territorial borders.  As a result, 
what Madison called the “republican remedy” to renegade state posi-
tions on particular policy matters is undermined:  rather than permit-
373 For examples of pre-Lawrence state laws requiring registration for consensual 
sodomy convictions, see ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
8304(1)(a) (Supp. 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(a)(5)(B) (Supp. 2003); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 15:541(14.1) (2003).  At one point, 40% of registrants in New Orleans 
were convicted of sodomy, which was typically used to target male and female prosti-
tutes.  Pamela Coyle, 400 Sex Offenders in Region; Web Site Lists Many in N.O.:  44% 
Probably Prostitutes, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 2, 2000, at A1. 
374 In invalidating Texas’s position, the Lawrence majority observed that “laws once 
thought necessary and proper [can] in fact serve only to oppress.”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 579; cf. Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States:  Federalism and Constitutional 
Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1746-48 (2004) (observing in the context of state con-
stitutional rights the existence of “laggard” states, sovereigns that refuse to transform 
their norms in accord with the experience of their “vanguard” counterparts). 
375 Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 448 
(2002).  As Professor Baker points out, while Southern slavery is often attributed to 
states’ rights-based federalism, abolitionism in fact first developed in Northern states, 
which struggled against national efforts to squelch such opposition.  Id.; see also id. 
(“Diversity always entails the freedom to make wrong choices.”); Klein, supra note 371, 
at 1568 (“Whose ox federalism gores may simply depend upon who controls Congress, 
the Court and each state.”); cf. Young, supra note 354, at 55-56 (“One man’s regulatory 
competition may be another’s ‘race to the bottom’ . . . .”). 
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ting such outlier positions to remain isolated and discrete, they are 
spread throughout the land.376  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has addressed a unique phenomenon with expansive 
repercussions:  the use by states of criminal convictions rendered by 
fellow sovereign state governments.  In particular, the Article has ex-
amined two types of state laws—criminal recidivist and sex-offender 
registration provisions—designed to ensure continued accountability 
of ex-offenders, who, like their fellow citizens, enjoy the constitutional 
right to travel among the respective states.  Though interconnection is 
common in the federal-state (vertical) federalism context with respect 
to civil377 and criminal378 matters alike, it has been far less so in the 
state-state (horizontal) federalism context.  Among the states, it is cus-
376 According to Madison, federalism was created with such potentialities for state 
extremism in mind.  Rather than nullifying such laws, federalism ideally allowed them 
to remain localized to specific states: 
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular 
States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other 
States . . . . A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts . . . or for any 
other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body 
of the Union than a particular member of it . . . . In the extent and proper 
structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the dis-
eases most incident to republican government. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
377 See, e.g., Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that the U.S. Bankruptcy Code relies on state law for identification of the 
bankrupt’s assets, that the U.S. Tax Code relies on state property law, and that the U.S. 
Social Security system relies upon state law definitions of marriage); 28 U.S.C. § 
1346(b) (2002) (incorporating state tort law into the Federal Tort Claims Act).  More-
over, as noted, in the common law context, Erie requires the application of state sub-
stantive law in federal civil diversity suits.  See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying 
text. 
378 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (9) (2000) (making it a federal crime to possess 
a firearm after being convicted of state felonies and selected misdemeanors).  See gen-
erally Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”:  Federal Recourse to State Law in 
Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV (forthcoming 2006) (surveying a variety of instances of 
federal use of state criminal laws to effectuate federal criminal justice goals).  On the 
other hand, federal authorities often expressly eschew reliance on state criminal laws 
and policies.  Most notably, in instances of concurrent jurisdiction, in deciding 
whether or not to indict for a federal capital crime, federal prosecutors need not defer 
to the anti-death-penalty views of states.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL § 9-10.070 (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_ 
reading_room/usam/title9/10mcrm.htm#9-10.070; cf. United States v. Sampson, 300 
F. Supp. 2d 278, 283 (D. Mass. 2004) (imposing a death sentence on a resident of Mas-
sachusetts, a non-capital jurisdiction, and designating that the execution take place in 
New Hampshire, which authorizes the death penalty). 
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tomary to see more competition than cooperation,379 and a self-
conscious fealty to the concept of independent and autonomous rule. 
As the discussion here makes clear, however, states have over time 
shown an increasing willingness to use one another’s criminal law dis-
positions, prompted by their unremitting desire to expand the bounds 
of crime control.  In doing so, they model a game-theoretic form of 
iterated strategic coordination based on common interests,380 rather 
than a standardized one-shot prisoners’ dilemma model based on 
conflicting competitive interests.381  Furthermore, the very process of 
interconnection undercuts the generally accepted wisdom that a sov-
ereign’s criminal laws have no effect beyond its borders.382  Recidivist 
and registration laws most certainly do have extraterritorial legal ef-
fects, on a daily basis significantly impacting the lives of ex-offenders 
who immigrate from one state to another. 
Beyond its theoretical ramifications, interconnection has a variety 
of practical consequences.  Borrowing one another’s criminal law out-
comes fulfills a basic evidentiary need for state justice systems, ena-
bling them to effectuate their recidivist and registration regimes with 
information provided by other states.  In addition, interconnection 
provides states with an opportunity to learn how their fellow sover-
eigns address anti-social behavior, which ideally affords them a salu-
tary opportunity for self-analysis and evolutionary change. 
Yet, at the same time, interconnection indisputably creates signifi-
cant practical challenges. States must undertake the unusual task of 
interpreting the criminal laws and records of their fellow sovereigns, a 
379 See generally COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:  
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid 
eds., 1991) (discussing interstate competitiveness in a variety of contexts). 
380 See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION:  AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME 
THEORY 29-31 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing coordination games, in which parties have 
common interests that can be achieved only through coordinated strategies).  On co-
ordination games more generally, see RUSSELL W. COOPER, COORDINATION GAMES:  
COMPLEMENTARITIES AND MACROECONOMICS (1999); Duncan Snidel, Coordination Ver-
sus Prisoners’ Dilemma:  Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 923, 931-33 (1985). 
381 See HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING:  A PROBLEM-CENTERED INTRO-
DUCTION TO MODELING STRATEGIC INTERACTION 19 (2000)(discussing this phenome-
non). 
382 See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) (observing that state 
criminal laws lack “force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which en-
acts them”); cf. People v. Betts, 103 P.3d 883, 886 (Cal.) (“It long has been established 
that a state will entertain a criminal proceeding only to enforce its own criminal laws, 
and will not assume authority to enforce the penal laws of other states or the federal 
government . . . .”), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2949 (2005). 
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difficult and resource-intensive enterprise.  For their part, ex-
offenders, while not typically trained in the law, must fathom foreign 
laws and records, and they often suffer unequal treatment compared 
to other similarly situated individuals. 
Interconnection also has potentially troublesome policy-based 
ramifications.  Very often, the borrowing that states undertake as-
sumes the form of substitution; although not compelled to do so, 
states permit foreign criminal law norms to take the place of their 
own.  As a result, a key advantage of federalism is undermined:  its ser-
vice to democratic pluralism and capacity to reflect local values.  In-
terconnection can thus contribute to the development of a criminal 
law orthodoxy, which, when foreign laws embody draconian, ill-
conceived practices or outdated social mores, can bear troublesome 
historically and geographically contingent consequences.  Rather than 
isolating criminal justice experiments to the confines of individual 
states, interconnection replicates them across the nation as a whole, 
over time possibly contributing to a race-to-the-bottom of harshness. 
Despite these concerns, state interconnection is likely to increase 
in coming years, given Americans’ ever-growing anxiety over crime383 
and criminal offenders (sex offenders in particular).384  Moreover, to 
the extent interconnection promotes greater uniformity and coopera-
tion, states can be expected to find appeal in the increased efficiency 
it promises.385
383 See Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1751, 1752 (1999) (arguing that “moral panics” about crime have led to 
draconian punishments and increased punitiveness in contemporary American soci-
ety). 
384 See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 975 P.2d 30, 34 (Cal. 1999) (“California has a con-
tinuing interest in tracking sex offenders outside state boundaries, to assure continu-
ing surveillance and notification to interested authorities in other states.”); id. at 36 
(Brown, J., dissenting) (“Given the ‘continuing threat to society’ posed by sex offend-
ers, official knowledge of their whereabouts is imperative. That concern does not sig-
nificantly diminish when they cross state lines . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
385 See David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law 
Rules:  An American Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom,” in the European Communities, 32 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 423, 436 (1991) (noting that interjurisdictional uniformity “saves the 
decisionmakers and transactors the costs of having to develop and learn a multiplicity 
of rules”); Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 361, at 132 (noting that uniform laws can 
reduce inconsistency costs).  Indeed, Congress has become increasingly interested in 
making the nation’s network of disparate state-based sex-offender registration systems 
more uniform and integrated.  See Josh Gerstein, N.Y.’s Senators Offer 2 Visions on One 
Subject, N.Y. SUN, Aug. 2, 2005, at 1 (quoting U.S. Senator Charles Schumer’s statement 
that “[c]onvicted sex offenders shouldn’t be able to escape the letter of the law just by 
moving across state lines”). 
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By the same token, as the laws continue to evolve, it is unlikely 
that the ills associated with interconnection will be redressed, given 
the evident lack of institutional incentives.  Of course, foreign states, 
where the predicate convictions occurred, will be unlikely to complain 
about ex-offenders that are now out of their hair, and, so far as they 
are concerned, the subsequent registration or sentencing decisions of 
other states are externalities that have no direct impact on them.  For 
forum states, on the other hand, interconnection carries implementa-
tion costs, requiring expenditures in corrections (for example, prison 
beds and maintaining registration and perhaps community-
notification systems) and the justice system (for example, court time 
and resources).  However, just as states do not usually complain about 
the increasing “federalization” of crime,386 they are unlikely to get up-
set over the more subtle, yet more pervasive, incursion by other states.  
States will very likely consider the resources expended to be simply a 
cost of doing business amid the nation’s ongoing “get tough” political 
atmosphere, which ex-offenders are ill-equipped to politically com-
bat.387  Finally, the judiciary will not likely have cause for concern, 
given that no winning issues of constitutional magnitude present 
themselves.388
This Article has sought to highlight a pervasive phenomenon that 
to date has eluded the attention of courts and commentators.  Rather 
than focusing on the typical federalism concern of federal-state rela-
tions, and attendant worry of federal usurpation of state criminal jus-
tice prerogatives, discussion has centered on the far more common 
(and practically important) interrelations between states, which on a 
daily basis process the vast majority of criminal offenders in America.  
Much as states are increasingly now engaged in dialogues regarding 
the interpretation of their respective constitutions,389 so too are they 
386 See Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines:  A Case 
Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 908 (2000) (noting that “few 
local lawmakers or prosecutors are heard complaining about federalization”). 
387 See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text. 
388 See supra notes 286-321 and accompanying text. 
389 For discussion of this phenomenon, see Symposium, Dual Enforcement of Consti-
tutional Norms, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2005).  As Professors Garnder and Rossi 
observed in introducing the symposium, “State constitutions have entered into a new 
interpretative era. . . .  A borrowing mentality [has] emerged, as courts look[] outside 
of their jurisdictional territories to state constitutions to fill gaps in constitutional in-
terpretation.”  James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi, Foreword:  The New Frontier of State Constitu-
tional Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1231, 1231 (2005); see also id. at 1232 (noting the 
recent origins of a new “collective enterprise of democratic self-governance”); cf. Mi-
chael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. 
  
2005] HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM 333 
 
reaching out to one another in their criminal justice missions.  In do-
ing so, however, they are compelled to reconcile federalism’s inherent 
age-old tension between comity and autonomy.  How they go about 
this, and the outcomes they reach, will have a significant impact on 
criminal justice policy and practice in the years to come. 
L. REV. 267, 434 (1998) (asserting that federalism promotes a salutary “experimentalist 
collaboration between the states and the federal government”). 
